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Executive Summary 
The telecommunications industry is undergoing rapid 
change due to technological advances and deregulation. The 
industry that began with the telephone now includes cable, 
wireless and satellite communications, and the Internet. 
California’s tax system has not kept pace with the telecom­
munications industry. The myriad taxes and charges on 
telecommunications in California were established for an in­
dustry that was legally, technologically, and structurally very 
different than it is today. Many taxes remain targeted to a 
specific technology (for example, telephone taxes or cable 
franchise fees), despite the blurring of distinctions between 
technologies that provide similar services (for example, the 
telephone and Internet telephony). The convergence of former­
ly distinct communications technologies renders the existing 
tax structure difficult to justify in terms of economic efficiency 
or equity. 
In this report, we review and analyze telecommunications 
taxes and fees in California. The primary objectives of our 
research were (1) to provide a comprehensive overview of the 
telecommunications tax system in the state, including all taxes, 
fees, and surcharges paid by telecommunications service 
providers and their customers; and (2) to examine the economic 
consequences of current tax policy, including inequity, inef­
ficiency, and administrative complexity. 
California’s tax system has not kept pace 
with the telecommunications industry. The 
conver ge nce of fo r m e r ly dis tinc t 
communications technologies renders the 
existing tax structure difficult to justify in 
terms of economic efficiency or equity. 
As policymakers at all levels of government confront the 
challenge of reforming our tax system to encourage new tech­
nology and broad access to various telecommunications ser­
vices, including Internet access, while at the same time address­
ing the needs of tax equity and revenue sufficiency, they must 
first have a clear understanding of the current tax system and 
the incentives it creates. 
Tax Rates 
We find that the cumulative tax rates (including all taxes, 
fees, and surcharges) are higher for telecommunications ser­
vices than other goods and services. The total tax rate on 
intrastate services (for example, within-state long-distance) 
ranges from 7.83 percent to 18.83 percent and includes the 
federal excise tax of 3 percent, various statewide taxes and 
surcharges totaling 4.83 percent, and a local tax that varies 
across cities from zero to 11 percent. 
The total tax rate on interstate services (that is, long-distance 
calls to other states) is even higher, ranging from 10.28 to 21.28 
percent or higher. This rate consists of the 3 percent federal 
excise tax, a 7.28 percent federal universal-service charge 
(C)
 Tax Analysts 2003. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content. 
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Special Report / Viewpoint 
(which is sometimes passed on to consumers at a higher rate), 
and the zero to 11 percent local tax. 
Equity 
The distribution of the burden of current telecommunica­
tions taxes is not equitable according to any accepted equity 
principle. According to the benefit principle, the burden of a 
tax should be distributed according to the benefits received 
from the governmental activities financed by the tax. Many of 
the taxes imposed on telecommunications are revenue-based, 
and companies pass them along to consumers in proportion to 
their expenditure. However, the benefit these taxpayers receive 
from goods and services financed by these taxes is not linked 
to their tax burden in any way, as would be required by the 
benefit principle. 
Furthermore, because the share of household income spent 
on telecommunications decreases as household income in­
creases, the telecommunications tax burden is distributed 
regressively with respect to income. This violates the ability-
to-pay principle, which holds that tax burdens should be dis­
tributed among taxpayers according to their ability to pay, 
typically as measured by income. 
Finally, horizontal equity requires that taxpayers of equal 
ability to pay bear equal tax burdens, which is impossible with 
revenue taxation because taxpayers with similar incomes may 
spend differing amounts on telecommunications. 
Taxation Differences Across Technologies 
Today there are many alternatives to the traditional wireline 
telephone call, including wireless service and voice communi­
cation over the Internet (Internet telephony). Our research 
shows that the tax burden varies across technologies. For 
example, traditional telephone companies are subject to a much 
broader range of federal, state, and local taxes than are some 
of their new competitors (for example, cable or satellite 
providers). 
Consumers of cable or satellite services do not pay the 
federal excise tax or federal and state taxes and charges to 
support universal service. The largest potential “leakage” for 
voice communications is Internet telephony, which escapes 
federal and state universal-service taxes, the federal excise tax, 
and the local utility tax. 
Other potential sources of discriminatory tax treatment are 
local franchise fees, which cable companies pay and local 
exchange carriers do not, and property tax laws. The property 
of most telephone carriers is state-assessed annually at market 
value, while cable television companies are locally assessed 
with annual increases in assessed value limited to 2 percent. 
There is little economic justification for these differences in 
treatment across technologies, because efficient taxes (which 
introduce the least distortion in consumer and producer 
decisions) depend on the demand for the final service 
produced, not on the technology underlying the service. Favor­
ing one technology over another may reduce consumer and 
producer welfare over time. 
Efficiency 
Efficient economic outcomes maximize the total economic 
benefits received by consumers and firms. Excess burden, the 
term for the inefficiency caused by a tax, is the loss in a 
taxpayer’s well-being above and beyond the tax revenue col­
lected. Taxation of revenue causes excess burden because the 
higher prices that result decrease consumption of telecom­
munications services. The decrease in consumption and sub­
sequent excess burden will be greater when taxing services 
such as cellular as compared with local-access service because 
cellular consumers are more sensitive to price changes. Excess 
burden is a pure efficiency loss in the economy, reducing the 
consumers’ economic benefits by more than the amount of tax 
revenue that the taxing authority gains. 
We estimate, very conservatively, that the current set of 
telecommunications taxes leads to at least a 4 percent efficien­
cy loss, or excess burden, in California. We show that the 
efficiency loss can be reduced without affecting tax collections 
by raising the tax rate on revenue from local exchange access 
(whose demand is relatively insensitive to price) and lowering 
the rates on other services, such as long-distance and wireless 
communication. 
The existing tax structure may also result in efficiency losses 
that compound over time — dynamic efficiency losses. Dis­
crimination among telecommunications firms or between 
telecommunications companies and other companies distorts 
the rates of return on investment across companies, thereby 
reducing the economic benefits realized from the growth of the 
telecommunications industry and its various components. 
Consumption Distortions 
Consumers’ choices between competing telecommunica­
tions services are affected by differences in taxes on these 
services. Consumers today have many avenues to avoid the 
taxes on traditional service. For example, Internet telephony 
services escape all telecommunications taxes, and consumers 
consequently have an added incentive to switch to Internet-
based telephony. As consumers switch from taxed to untaxed 
services, federal, state, and local governments will see their tax 
revenues decline. 
Differences Across Locations 
Telecommunication costs vary among cities and counties in 
California due to variations in the local utility user tax (UUT) 
and local franchise fees. The UUT rate ranges from zero to 11 
percent across cities; the UUT tax base also varies. 
Our comparison to neighboring and other large states shows 
that California has a greater number of state telecommunica­
tions taxes, which raises administrative and compliance costs 
for telecommunications companies doing business in the state. 
California, however, does not impose relatively higher tax rates 
on telecommunications. Telecommunications taxes, therefore, 
probably play a negligible role in business or household 
decisions to locate in California, but may influence the siting 
choices of some heavy users of telecommunications within the 
state. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Telecommunications represents a major path by which fu­
ture economic growth will continue to travel. Although the 
telecommunications industry is currently a relatively small part 
of California’s overall economy — about 2 percent (measured 
by income) — it has been growing rapidly and contributing 
significantly to economic growth as it raises the productivity 
of a wide range of other industries. Hence, its total impact on 
the economy is much greater than its size suggests. 
As noted, California’s tax system has not kept pace with the 
telecommunications industry. Technological developments 
and deregulation have resulted in new entities that do not fit the 
traditional definition of telecommunications providers under 
(C)
 Tax Analysts 2003. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
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state tax laws. This situation results in differing treatment of 
businesses competing to provide the same service. The current 
treatment of the industry violates basic principles of good 
taxation; in that it is inefficient, inequitable, and creates exces­
sive administrative and compliance costs. 
If developing the telecommunications infrastructure, and 
hence the economy as whole, is a goal of state economic policy, 
then tax policy should support this goal by encouraging (or at 
least not discouraging) investment in California’s telecom­
munications industry. 
California should extend the manufacturers’ 
investment credit and sales tax exemption for 
new equipment purchases to telecommunica­
tions companies. 
Although our chief objective has been to present informa­
tion rather than to advocate particular reforms, we conclude by 
suggesting a few improvements our analysis points to. These 
may lay the groundwork for potential reform of California’s 
telecommunications tax system. Some of these recommenda­
tions can be implemented unilaterally by the state. Others 
require California to cooperate with local governments or with 
other states. 
California should extend the manufacturers’ invest­
ment credit (MIC) and sales tax exemption for new 
equipment purchases to telecommunications com­
panies. The primary purpose of the MIC and sales tax 
exemption on equipment purchases is to avoid the 
pyramiding of taxes that can occur when both the inputs 
used to produce goods and services and the goods and 
services themselves are subject to the sales tax. While not 
subject to the sales tax, telecommunications services are 
subject to other taxes that total more than the sales tax. 
Because the MIC is intended to encourage investment, 
there is no reason for excluding telecommunications, 
given their importance in the New Economy. 
California should examine whether the income ap­
portionment rules for its corporate franchise and 
income taxes are appropriate for telecommunications 
services. All states must cooperate to ensure that multi-
state income is being apportioned to the proper states to 
avoid double taxation. 
California should work with other states and the 
federal government to establish new nexus guidelines 
for the Information Age. Federal Public Law 86-272 
limits a state’s power to tax an out-of-state company’s 
income from sales of tangible property within the state, 
when the property is shipped from out of state. This law 
should be broadened to cover intangibles, such as 
telecommunications and Internet services, and extended 
to other types of taxes. 
California should, in cooperation with its local gov­
ernments, simplify and consolidate the various taxes 
and charges imposed on end-user revenues by local 
jurisdictions and the Public Utilities Commission. 
California telecommunications customers currently pay 
seven different statewide taxes, fees, or surcharges in 
addition to the federal excise tax and universal-service 
charges, and possibly a local utility user tax on their 
purchases of telecommunications services. Consolida­
tion of statewide charges would significantly reduce the 
administrative burden of telecommunications companies 
in the state. Switching to a simple per-line charge to fund 
universal-service programs would result in fewer con­
sumption distortions, less excess burden from taxation, 
and greater efficiency. If nonuniform rates are desired, 
long-distance service should be taxed less than local 
service to minimize the efficiency loss caused by taxation 
(which is the opposite of the current tax structure). 
California should encourage local jurisdictions to 
unify the local utility user tax. The compliance burden 
on telecommunications companies could be significantly 
reduced if local jurisdictions were to adopt a uniform rate 
and base for the utility user tax. 
California should establish uniform assessment of 
business property. Neither the assessed value of busi­
ness property nor the allocation of the property tax reve­
nue from a particular property should be dependent upon 
who assesses it. Market-value assessment would be the 
most equitable and efficient method. 
California should urge local governments to examine 
their local franchise fees. Local franchise fees should 
be set to cover no more than the costs to local govern­
ments of managing public rights-of-way, not to fund 
general municipal budgets. All providers of telecom­
munication services should be equally subject to these 
minimal franchise fees so as to avoid competitive ad­
vantages that influence the future development of new 
technologies. 
California and other states should urge the federal 
government to clarify issues regarding Internet and 
cable telephony. Currently, telephone calls placed over 
the Internet are not subject to federal, state, or local taxes, 
and thus enjoy a competitive advantage. As the quality 
of such calls improves, more consumers will switch, 
which may lead to decreased economic efficiency and 
reduced government revenues. Certain forms of cable 
telephony raise unresolved issues regarding the ap­
plicability of the franchise fee and whether the property 
is subject to state or local assessment. 
California and other states should monitor and work 
with the federal government in its efforts to restrict 
state and local tax systems. Maintaining a competitive­
ly neutral tax system in California may require expanding 
the tax base to include previously untaxed services, such 
as In ter net acces s. C u r r en tly, fe de r a l and s t ate 
moratoriums prevent such reforms. 
California should work with local governments to 
provide uniform relief for low-income individuals 
and households. Th e t axe s cu rr ently imposed on 
telecommunications services are regressive: Taxes rep­
resent a larger percentage of a low-income household’s 
income than a high-income household’s. A few cities 
offer UUT exemptions for low-income individuals, and 
(C)
 Tax Analysts 2003. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content. 
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some relief from statewide surcharges exists, but the 
relief is not uniform. 
Social And Economic Consequences 

Of Existing Telecommunications Tax Policy
 
In this section, we examine the social and economic conse­
quences of the existing tax policy. Given the importance of 
telecommunications to the modern social fabric, there are 
undoubtedly many social implications of tax policy that are 
outside the scope of this project. We focus on a few issues 
relating to the equity of the current tax policy regarding 
telecommunications. We also consider the economic conse­
quences of the taxes, discussing administrative costs and the 
static and dynamic efficiency losses from the current tax struc­
ture. 
Equity 
Central to most notions of good taxation is that taxes should 
be equitable. Oddly, there is no simple definition of “equity” 
that sets a clear legal standard for taxation in the United States. 
Therefore the term “equitable” may mean very different things 
to different interest groups. Below we discuss different con­
cepts of equitable taxation, as they apply to equity among 
consumers and equity between telecommunications providers 
and end-users. 
Equity Among Consumers 
In this section we discuss three of the more common notions 
of equity among legal theorists and apply them to current 
telecommunications tax policy: the benefit principle, the 
ability-to-pay principle, and the horizontal-equity principle. 1 
The benefit principle. According to the benefit principle, 
the burden of a particular tax should be distributed according 
to the benefits that taxpayers receive from the government 
activities financed by the tax. A tax in the present context that 
clearly violates the benefit principle is the federal excise tax 
(FET) levied on tel ecommun icat ions. B ecau se n eit her 
telecommunications providers nor their customers benefit dis­
proportionately from the broad range of goods and services 
financed in the federal budget, the benefit principle implies that 
there is no rationale for the FET. However, the benefit principle 
is sometimes cited to justify taxing telecommunications ser­
vices when the revenue is used to fund telecommunications-
related programs, such as universal-service programs. 
The presence of positive network externalities is often cited 
as justification for universal-service programs. Network exter­
nalities exist when the benefits of the telecommunications 
network to any individual subscriber increase as the number of 
subscribers increases. Therefore, all subscribers to the network 
benefit from the addition of a single subscriber. Some 
proponents of universal service argue that because telecom­
munications users are the primary beneficiaries of network 
expansion through universal service, then according to the 
benefit principle they should bear the burden of financing these 
programs. 
This argument is deficient on several counts. While the 
theory behind the network externalities idea is formally correct, 
1 See Rakowski (2000) for a good overview of the benefit and ability-to-pay 
principles (albeit in a different taxation context). He refers to the ability-to-pay 
principle as a particular case of the “fair sacrifice” doctrine. 
it probably has little actual relevance in California today. First, 
in a highly developed country like the United States, with a 
high household telephone penetration level (95.1 percent 
nationwide, 97.0 percent in California), anyone picking up a 
telephone can reach hundreds of millions of other subscribers. 
The value of one more subscriber to any one user is virtually 
zero.2 In the few cases in which adding a new subscriber would 
be of benefit to a particular existing subscriber (perhaps be­
cause the new subscriber is a relative or friend), the argument 
for private subsidization is stronger than that for public sub­
sidization.3 
In fact, non-negligible network externalities are likely to be 
found, if anywhere, among lower-income and rural com­
munities of subscribers — communities whose members are 
ostensibly being added to the network by universal-service 
programs. A straightforward application of the benefit principle 
would place a relatively higher taxation burden on these com­
munities, which is obviously not the actual practice. 
It is not at all clear that those who consume 
mor e te le c o m m unic a tions s e r v ic e s 
necessarily benefit more than those who 
consume fewer. 
The other main problem with using the benefit principle to 
justify universal-service funding mechanisms is that it is not at 
all clear that those who consume more telecommunications 
services necessarily benefit more than those who consume 
fewer. Recall that the universal-service taxes are revenue taxes, 
not per-line charges. Why should the benefit received from 
using the network be directly proportional to the amount of 
money spent on telecommunications (that is, the number or 
duration of calls)? Those who espouse the network externality 
argument for universal service often mention the “option 
value” externality: even if an existing user never calls the new 
subscriber added to the network, the existing user still benefits 
because of the option to call the new subscriber. The option has 
value, even if it is not exercised. Again, while this argument is 
formally correct, the magnitude of the option value is probably 
minuscule in most cases. More germane to the present argu­
ment because the option value does not correspond to revenue 
(at all, if the option remains unexercised), the benefit clearly 
cannot be proportional to realized telecommunications reve­
nue. Thus, using the benefit principle to justify revenue taxa­
tion for universal-service purposes is an informal argument that 
careful analysis does not support. 
The emergency telephone service (911) fee could also be 
justified as a charge that benefits telecommunications users. 
The argument here would rest not on network externalities but 
on social externalities. If there is value to society from an 
individual being able to use a telephone in case of a police, fire, 
or medical emergency, then telephone network access creates 
social externalities beyond the purely private benefits to the 
2
 Belinfante (2002), Tables 1 and 2, pp. 6 and 8. 
3
 Crandall and Waverman (2000) argue against network externalities as a 
justification for universal-service programs at all. 
(C)
 Tax Analysts 2003. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content. 
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caller. Again, however, the benefit principle rests not on merely 
identifying externalities or benefits, but on linking the burden 
of taxation to the accrual of the benefits. Once again, there is 
little reason to think that the social externalities created by 
universal 911 access are proportional (or even correlated at all) 
with the expenditure by an individual on telecommunications. 
The current system of financing universal and emergency 
services from revenue taxes, as opposed to flat charges, can be 
justified by the benefit principle only if the benefits can be 
linked directly to expenditure, which clearly cannot be done. 
Another problem with using the benefit principle to justify 
the 911 fee is that its revenue is not used solely to fund 911 
services. As Andal (1996) points out, the funds collected are 
deposited into an account in the state’s general fund. Because 
it is a general fund account, it has periodically been raided to 
support non-telecommunications obligations.4 
Finally, co nsider the u til ity use r taxes (UUTs) that 
municipalities may place on telecommunications. Businesses 
and individuals benefit directly or indirectly from a range of 
public goods and services provided by state and local govern­
ments, such as a judicial system, police and fire protection, 
roads, and schools. But there is no evidence that telecom­
munications providers and their customers receive special 
benefits from these services or impose higher costs to justify 
higher tax burdens for providing these services than are faced 
by other businesses or consumers. The benefit principle pro­
vides no rationale for imposing higher income, property, or 
transactions taxes on this industry. 
We close this section by noting that none of our arguments 
here should necessarily be construed as arguments against 
telecommunications taxation. We are merely pointing out that 
careful analysis leads us to conclude that any attempt to justify 
such taxation by appealing to the benefit principle is ill-
reasoned at best and deceptive at worst. The true motivation 
underlying revenue taxation appears to be redistributive in 
nature (that is, the more affluent should subsidize the less 
affluent). 
The ability-to-pay principle. The ability-to-pay principle 
holds that tax burdens should be distributed among taxpayers 
according to their ability to pay, typically as measured by 
income. The incidence of a tax is often measured in terms of 
the percentage of income paid in taxes. A tax is said to be 
regressive if the percentage of income paid in tax falls as 
income rises, proportional if the percentage of income paid in 
taxes stays the same as income rises, and progressive if the 
percentage of income paid in taxes rises as income rises. Strict 
adherence to the ability-to-pay principle requires proportional 
taxation, although policymakers often use the ability-to-pay 
principle loosely to justify progressive, redistributive taxation 
as well. Regressive taxes violate the ability-to-pay principle by 
any definition. 
Evidence suggests that the consumer burden of telecom­
munications taxes is distributed regressively with respect to 
4
 Andal (1996) points out that in fiscal 1991 and 1992, $23 million was 
taken from the State Emergency Telephone Number Account. In fiscal 1993, 
$15 million was diverted to the general fund, and in fiscal 1994, $11 million 
was diverted. The California Assembly Utilities and Commerce Committee 
concluded that the approved upgrading of 911 facilities in 25 counties was 
delayed in 1993-94 because of the fund diversions. 
income. In fact, the Congressional Budget Office reports that 
the burden of the FET is distributed even more regressively 
than federal taxes on alcoholic beverages and tobacco, two 
taxes widely believed to be highly regressive.5 To show that ad 
valorem (revenue-based) taxation of telecommunications is 
regressive, one need merely note that the share of income spent 
on telecommunications decreases as the income of the 
household increases. A constant revenue tax rate plus a decreas­
ing share of income devoted to telecommunications services 
means that higher-income households bear proportionately less 
burden than do low-income households. Using 1998 figures 
from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, Cordes, et al. (2000) 
calculate that the share of telecommunications taxes paid by 
households with annual incomes less than $40,000 exceeds 
these households’ shares of total income. For example, al­
though households earning $5,000 to $10,000 annually have 
only 1.8 percent of total income in the United States, they bear 
6 percent of the telecommunication tax burden — a highly 
regressive outcome. These calculations apply to any revenue-
based form of taxation, be it federal, state, or local. 
The horizontal equity principle. A subcomponent of the 
ability-to-pay principle is the horizontal equity principle, 
which states that among taxpayers of equal ability to pay, the 
tax burden should also be equal. Clearly, horizontal equity is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition to satisfy the ability-to­
pay principle described in the previous section. Ad valorem 
taxation violates the principle of horizontal equity (and there­
fore the ability-to-pay principle) if subscribers of similar in­
comes spend differing amounts on telecommunications, which 
is clearly the case. If the horizontal equity and ability-to-pay 
principles are to be taken seriously, then the current revenue 
taxation should be replaced with income-based taxation. In 
other words, by drawing the funding for universal service from 
the general income tax system, we would come closer to 
satisfying the ability-to-pay principle than does the current 
system of telecommunications-specific revenue taxation. 
Equity Between Telecommunications
Providers and Subscribers 
Another equity consideration is the division of the tax 
burden between telecommunications providers and their sub­
scribers. Given that there is no objective measure of equity 
between consumers and firms (especially so, given that con­
sumers, as stockholders, are also the owners of the firms), 
“fairness” here is perhaps nothing more than what the median 
voter believes it is. Here, we confine ourselves to pointing out 
that the legal incidence of the tax (that is, the party upon whom 
the tax is legally levied) may be strikingly different than the 
economic incidence of the tax (who actually pays the tax). 
In the simplest textbook arguments, the legal incidence of 
the tax bears no relation whatsoever to the economic incidence, 
which is determined solely by the responsiveness of supply and 
demand to price changes.6 The intuition is that even if the law 
5
 U.S. Congressional Budget Office (1987). 
6
 From the textbook model (which assumes homogeneous products and 
competitive supply) one derives that the share of the tax burden borne by 
consumers is εS/(εS + |εD|), where εS is the elasticity of supply and |εD| is the 
magnitude of the elasticity of demand. The elasticity of supply is the percentage 
change in quantity supplied due to a 1 percent increase in price; the elasticity 
of demand is the percentage change in quantity demanded due to a 1 percent 
increase in price (see also following note). 
(C)
 Tax Analysts 2003. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content. 
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requires the firms to pay the tax, they will shift at least part of 
the burden on to consumers through higher prices. The extent 
to which businesses are able to shift the tax burden forward to 
consumers in the form of higher prices depends in part on how 
sensitive consumers are to changes in price — a concept 
e conomi st s term t he price el asticity of demand.7 Th e 
preponderance of evidence suggests that consumer demand for 
telecommunications services is relatively inelastic compared 
with supply elasticities.8 In this case, it is likely that consumers 
will bear a larger share of the tax burden on telecommunica­
tions services than do the providers. 
Efficiency 
The main contribution of economic theory to the field of 
taxation is an emphasis that some forms of taxation are more 
efficient than others. The key insight is that whenever taxes 
distort economic decisions made by producers and consumers, 
they impose efficiency costs on the economy. Simply put, some 
of the potential economic benefits that could accrue to 
producers or consumers are thrown away when there is ineffi­
cient taxation. Whenever a tax system is inefficient, a more 
efficient system could raise the same tax revenue with less 
economic harm done to consumers and firms. Another implica­
tion of inefficiency is that a more efficient tax system could 
raise more tax revenue and do no more harm to consumers and 
firms than the current system does. In this section, we discuss 
three areas of concern in California: the lack of administrative 
simplicity, static efficiency, and dynamic efficiency in the 
current telecommunications tax system. 
Administrative Simplicity 
In California, the evidence indicates that the current taxation 
system places higher administrative and compliance costs on 
telecommunication firms than on other types of firms. The 
more taxes, fees, surcharges, and excises that are levied on a 
good, the more administration (accounting, database, and bill­
ing costs) is required to comply with the law. Similarly, the 
more tax jurisdictions to which a firm is subject, the more 
administration is required. These administrative costs are pure 
losses to the economy because they are expenses incurred 
without creating anything of value for society and they take 
resources (such as labor, computer processing and storage, etc.) 
away from other productive uses. This notion is completely 
independent of the value of the programs funded by the taxes. 
According to the Council on State Taxation (2002a), the 
number of taxes imposed on telecommunications businesses 
nationwide is more than three times the number imposed on 
non-telecommunications vendors (391 versus 118). Further­
7
 The price elasticity of demand is a measure of the response of the quantity 
demanded to a change in price. Specifically, it is the percentage change in 
quantity demanded resulting from a 1 percent increase in price. If consumers 
do not alter their consumption very much in response to a price change, they 
are said to have an inelastic demand. 
8
 The elasticity of telecommunications demand depends upon the service 
considered. Given that the bulk of telecommunications expenditure is on local 
and long-distance service, and that both of these have been consistently 
measured to have inelastic demand (highly so, in the case of local service), it 
does not abuse the facts to speak of “telecommunications,” as a composite 
good, as having inelastic demand. See Taylor (1994) for a review of elasticity 
estimates for various telecommunications services. Supply elasticities are 
harder to come by, but in a competitive market in the long run, theory suggests 
they are nearly infinite (and therefore certainly larger than demand elasticities). 
more, telecommunications providers must deal with 929 more 
transaction tax bases and 6,956 more taxing jurisdictions than 
businesses in other sectors. The result is that in 2001 a 
full-service telecommunications provider, operating nation­
wide, had to file a mind-boggling 66,918 tax returns compared 
with 8,284 for sellers of most other goods and services. 
Static Efficiency 
Telecommunications taxes may distort consumers’ and 
producers’ decisions by driving a wedge between the price the 
consumer pays for the service and the revenue the firm keeps 
for providing the service. The wedge raises prices for con­
sumers and lowers the net revenue for the firms. The distortions 
in c onsumers’ a nd firms’ consumption and production 
decisions result in efficiency losses. These losses are static, in 
the sense that their calculation takes current consumer tastes 
and producers’ technology and productive capacity in the in­
dustry as given. Dynamic inefficiencies, discussed next, occur 
if the tax structure distorts the formation of consumer tastes, 
firms’ investment decisions, or the progress toward competi­
tion in the industry. 
In California, the evidence indicates that 
the current taxation system places higher 
administrative and compliance costs on 
telecommunications firms than on other 
types of firms. 
If telecommunications taxes and charges raise the price of 
telecommunications services relative to other goods and ser­
vices, consumers may respond by consuming fewer telecom­
munications services. When consumers or businesses alter 
their behavior in response to taxes, an excess burden is 
generated — a loss of economic well-being above and beyond 
the tax revenues collected.9 The magnitude of this excess 
burden increases in proportion to the magnitude of the con­
sumer response, as measured by the price elasticity of demand. 
An important aspect of excess burden is that it increases 
geometrically with the tax rate. In particular, the excess burden 
from a revenue tax rises with the square of the tax rate. This 
implies, for example, that doubling a tax rate from 1 percent to 
2 percent creates four times as much excess burden and forgone 
economic surplus. Estimates of the excess burden under the 
current tax system and under some alternatives are explored 
below. 
Excess Burden From the Current
State Telecommunications Tax System 
Assessing the costs and benefits of the current telecom­
munications tax system in the state requires at least an estimate 
of the excess burden (EB) of the taxation. Standard formulas 
for approximating the excess burden of a tax require knowing 
the tax rate, the market revenue generated by the good, and the 
elasticity of demand. The simplest formula to estimate the loss 
in consumer benefits from a revenue tax of rate t on a set of N 
different services is as follows: 
9
 Excess burden is also termed “deadweight loss” by economists. 
(C)
 Tax Analysts 2003. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content. 
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N 
EB = 1 t2∑εiRi2 
i = 1 
where: 
t is the revenue tax rate, 
εi is the elasticity of demand for service i with respect to 
its own price, 
and Ri is the market revenue (not the tax revenue) of 
service i. 10 
In this section we use this formula to estimate the forgone 
consumer benefits caused by the current set of telecommunica­
tions taxes. The figures we calculate are underestimates of the 
true lost economic benefits, for two reasons. First, the formula 
above implicitly assumes that all tax revenue is returned to 
consumers (or equivalently, that the governmental goods and 
services funded by the tax revenue are valued as highly as 
receiving the tax revenue as income would be). Second, we do 
not include lost producer benefits in the calculation.11 Estimates 
of excess burden that include lost producer benefits may be 
extraordinarily larger. For example, in a similar calculation of 
excess burden in a different context, Prieger (1998) found that 
lost-producer benefits from telecommunications revenue taxa­
tion may be 10 to 26 times as high as lost-consumer benefits. 
These numbers will fall as the competitiveness of the supply 
side of the telecommunications market increases. 
Table 1 (see next page) contains the results of our calcula­
tions. The main types of intrastate telecommunications services 
included in the calculation are basic local exchange service, 
intraLATA and interLATA toll calling, special-access services, 
and mobile wireless calling. Due to lack of data we cannot 
include such services as Internet access and cable telephony. 
Given that excess burden is nonlinear in the tax rate, the 
incremental damage to efficiency from state and local taxes is 
higher than it otherwise would be without the FET. The first 
line of Table 1 shows that the FET destroys about $2.5 million 
in potential economic benefits per year. The incremental losses 
from state taxes are in the next line; the state fees of 4.83 percent 
destroy another $14.6 million in potential benefits. Adding the 
median rate (5 percent) for the local UUT brings the incremen­
tal losses from state and local taxes to $43.3 million.12 Finally, 
if the UUT is set at the maximum observed rate in California 
(11 percent), the incremental excess burden from state and local 
taxes rises to $96.1 million annually, or about 4 percent of the 
state and local tax revenue assumed to be raised in the calcula­
tions. 
As we mentioned above, these efficiency losses are under­
estimates, because they do not include lost producer benefits. 
Including this part of the excess burden may raise the figures 
substantially. Hausman (1999), in an excess burden calculation 
that includes the producer side, has estimated that state and 
10
 The formula is an approximation because it ignores income effects, 
higher-order (curvature) terms in the demand function, and cross-price effects. 
It also assumes that marginal cost (MC) is constant, although MC need not be 
known. This formula is commonly used by practitioners. See Auerbach (1985) 
for a discussion of formulas to measure excess burden. 
11
 Estimating lost producer benefits requires knowledge of price and 
marginal cost, neither of which (particularly the latter) is easily available to us. 
12
 Five percent is the median UUT rate among localities with a UUT greater 
than zero. 
local telecommunications taxes on wireless services result in 
an excess burden that averages roughly 50 cents for each dollar 
of revenue raised (at a 14.5 percent tax rate), which is about 12 
times the highest loss we calculate.13 Hausman’s percentage 
efficiency loss is higher than our calculation in part because he 
considers only wireless service, which has high demand elas­
ticity relative to most other telecommunications services. Even 
so, our figure of 4 percent efficiency loss overall appears to be 
extremely conservative.14 For example, using the range of 10 
to 26 times as much producer losses as consumer losses men­
tioned before, the efficiency loss would range from 38 percent 
to 98 percent of the tax revenue raised. These figures are only 
meant to be suggestive because they are based on producer 
losses estimated in another context. 
Cordes, et al. (2000) provide another estimate of the excess 
burden. They claim that “the additional layer of federal, state, 
and local taxes imposed on long-distance services and wireless 
telephony could impose an excess burden of as much as $7 
billion” on the nation. Prorating at California’s population 
share of 12 percent in the nation leads to an excess burden for 
the state of about $888 million. Their estimate includes inter­
state as well as intrastate services; even so, our excess-burden 
calculations again appear to be quite conservative. 
Alternative 1: Rebalancing tax rates. The message of the 
preceding paragraphs is not necessarily that telecommunica­
tions taxes are undesirable because they create excess burden. 
Excess burden is merely part of the cost side of the cost-benefit 
analysis of any tax system. Even if the benefits are determined 
to justify the costs, the tax system could be restructured to 
reduce the inefficiency, while raising the same amount of tax 
revenue. This subsection and the next explore such alternatives. 
To equalize marginal excess burdens, tax 
rates must be higher on services for which 
demand is inelastic and lower on services 
for which demand is elastic. 
Casual inspection of the formula for excess burden in the 
previous section reveals that relatively inelastic goods (for 
which the ε in the equation is small) generate less excess burden 
than do relatively elastic goods (for which ε is larger). This 
implies that telecommunications services should not all be 
taxed at the same rate, because their demand elasticities are not 
equal. The most efficient tax system is one that raises needed 
revenue with the least excess burden possible. The rule for 
optimal commodity taxation (the Ramsey Rule) states that in 
order to minimize overall excess burden, the additional (mar­
ginal) excess burden of the last dollar of revenue raised from 
each commodity must be the same. To equalize marginal excess 
burdens, tax rates must be higher on services for which demand 
is inelastic, and lower on services for which demand is elastic. 
13
 Hausman (1999) uses a different formula for the consumer side of the 
calculation, based on log-linear demand and the compensated demand function. 
14
 Especially so, given that we are not breaking out high-elasticity services 
like second phone lines, Internet access, and DSL in the calculations. See 
Cordes, et al. (2000) for elasticity estimates for some of these other services. 
(C)
 Tax Analysts 2003. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content. 
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Table 1 
Excess Burden (Efficiency Loss) From the Current State and Local Telecommunications Tax System 
Taxes Included in Calculation 
Cumulative Revenue 
Tax Rate 
Annual Excess Burden on Consumers ($Millions) 
Total Incremental Over FET 
Federal Excise Tax (FET) 3.00% $2.50 — 
FET + State Fees 7.83% $17.06 $14.55 
FET + State Fees + Median UUT (5%) 12.83% $45.80 $43.29 
FET + State Fees + Maximum UUT (11%) 18.83% $98.65 $96.14 
Notes: The services included in the calculation are basic local exchange service, intraLATA and interLATA toll calling, special-access 
services, and mobile wireless. Calculations use the formula in the text. Revenues used in the calculations are from Cavazos and Eisner 
(2001). Elasticity data are from Hausman (1997b) (wireless) and Prieger (1998) (all others). 
The empirical literature on telecommunications demand 
suggests that elasticities vary widely across different services. 
Basic local exchange service has nearly completely inelastic 
demand. Demand for long-distance toll calling and wireless 
services is more responsive to price, and has higher elasticity. 
Applying the rule for optimal service-specific tax rates, then, 
implies that basic local exchange access should be taxed at a 
higher rate than other services. The optimal rebalancing tax 
rates are presented in Table 2 for three scenarios. In all 
scenarios, we assume that $777 million in tax revenue must be 
raised, which is about the revenue from the current state 
telecommunications tax of 4.83 percent.15 
For illustrative purposes, Scenario A in Table 2 ignores the 
federal excise tax (FET). The service-specific tax rates that 
raise the required revenue and that minimize excess burden 
(according to the above formula) range from 10.5 percent on 
local exchange access to less than 1 percent for wireless and 
toll calling. Because local access has highly inelastic demand, 
it bears the greatest burden. Excess burden totals $770,000 in 
Scenario A. 
In Scenario B, the excess-burden calculation includes the 
losses from the FET. However, the FET rate is assumed to be 
out of the control of the state-level policymaker, so that only 
the state tax rates can be adjusted. In this case, if negative tax 
rates (that is, subsidies) are not allowed, then the optimal rates 
are zero for all services except local access. Excess burden 
totals $3.7 million in Scenario B (including the effect from the 
FET). Compare this amount with the estimated (incremental) 
excess burden of $14.6 million from the current state taxes in 
Table 1: Rebalancing the service-specific rates leads to only a 
quarter as much excess burden. 
In Scenario C, the rebalancing rates are not constrained to 
be positive. If subsidies are allowed, then the optimal state rates 
for the non-access services are negative. These rates are nega­
tive to “undo” part of the 3 percent FET, because the optimal 
cumulative rates are less than that. In this scenario, the excess 
burden falls to about $2 million, nearly halving the efficiency 
losses in Scenario B. 
These calculations show that efficient taxation calls for the 
lion’s share of the revenue to be raised from local exchange 
access. Thus, a charge like the current SLC (a per-line charge 
15
 This figure is based on California intrastate revenue of $16.09 billion in 
1999 (Cavazos and Eisner, 2001). 
on local access) is an efficient one. Even better, perhaps, 
would be to broaden the tax base, as we explore in the next 
section. 
Alternative 2: Expanding the tax base. Because the 
excess burden in the preceding formula increases with the 
square of the tax rate, one often hears calls to broaden the 
revenue base on which a tax is applied, to reduce the tax rate 
and the excess burden. It is true that if there are no preexist­
ing taxes, then the broadest revenue base possible results in 
the least efficiency loss. However, when there are preexist­
ing taxes, broadening the revenue base may not improve 
efficiency. Here we explore two scenarios: broadening the 
state telecommunications tax base to include all telecom­
munications revenue, and including all revenue from any 
source. 
First, consider removing the restriction that the state tax 
be levied only on intrastate revenue. Then the tax base 
increases from the 1999 figure of $16.1 billion to $22.1 
billion. Increasing the base allows the state tax rate to be 
reduced. However, because the federal taxes already levied 
on interstate revenues are not in the control of California 
policymakers, any extension of state taxes to interstate 
revenues will increase the (already high) tax rates on inter­
state telecommunications services. For simplicity, consider 
the case in which all services will be taxed at the same rate. 
The result is labeled Scenario D in Table 3 (p. 774). Although 
the state tax rate drops from 4.8 percent to 3.5 percent, the 
excess burden increases. The efficiency gains of $5.2 mil­
lion from the decreased tax rates for intrastate services are 
outweighed by the extra efficiency losses of $17.8 million 
from interstate services. Unilateral broadening of the tax 
base by state actors, without readjustment of the federal 
telecommunications tax system, cannot improve consumer 
welfare. 
Similarly, broadening the telecommunications tax reve­
nue base to include all revenue to which the general sales 
tax applies cannot improve efficiency either, given that the 
sales tax rate in California is already set at an average of 7.5 
percent (refer to “Overview of Current State and Local 
Telecommunications Taxes in California” in the full report; 
to obtain, contact the California Policy Research Center). To 
demonstrate, we create Scenario E, in which the revenue 
requirement of $777 million is to be raised by a tax levied 
on all intrastate telecommunications services and on all 
goods and services currently subject to state sales tax. We 
(C)
 Tax Analysts 2003. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content. 
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Table 2 
Decreasing Excess Burden (Efficiency Loss) Through Rebalancing Tax Rates 
Scenario Service 
Demand 
Elasticity 
Intrastate 
Revenue 
($M) 
FET 
Rate 
Rebalanced 
State Tax 
Rate 
Rebalanced 
Cumulative 
Tax Rate 
Excess 
Burden 
($M) 
A 
Rebalancing 
Tax Rates 
— No FET 
Local Exchange Access* 0.02 6,764 0.0% 10.5% 10.5% 0.743 
IntraLATA Toll 0.4 1,282 0.0% 0.4% 0.4% 0.005 
InterLATA Intrastate Toll 0.72 3,858 0.0% 0.2% 0.2% 0.009 
Mobile Wireless 0.51 4,193 0.0% 0.3% 0.3% 0.013 
Total 16,097 0.770 
B 
Rebalancing 
Tax Rates 
— FET, No 
Subsidies 
Allowed 
Local Exchange Access* 0.02 6,764 3.0% 10.9% 13.9% 1.298 
All other services — 9,333 3.0% 0.0% 3.0% 2.443 
Total 16,097 3.741 
C 
Rebalancing 
Tax Rates 
— FET, No 
Restrictions 
Local Exchange Access* 0.02 6,764 3.0% 13.7% 16.7% 1.884 
IntraLATA Toll 0.4 1,282 3.0% -2.4% 0.6% 0.011 
InterLATA Intrastate Toll 0.72 3,858 3.0% -2.6% 0.4% 0.019 
Mobile Wireless 0.51 4,193 3.0% -2.5% 0.5% 0.028 
Total 16,097 1.942 
* Revenue for local exchange access includes CLEC revenue. 
Notes: Elasticity is defined to be |%∆Q/%∆P|. The revenue data are from Cavazos and Eisner (2001). Elasticity data are from Hausman 
(1997b) (wireless) and Prieger (1998) (all others). Excess-burden figure is calculated using the formula in the text, and includes the effect of 
the FET where applicable. Rebalanced cumulative tax rates are applied to an adjusted revenue figure for each service. The percent change 
in revenue resulting from the new tax rates is estimated as %∆P + %∆Q, which is approximated by ∆t*(1-ε), where t is the tax rate. The tax 
revenue requirement is $777 million.
assume an omnibus elasticity of 1.0 for sales-taxable goods and 
services. The tax base increases to about 30 times the exist­
ing amount, which allows the state telecommunications tax 
rate to drop from 4.8 percent to a mere 0.17 percent.16 Again, 
however, the efficiency gains from the decreased tax rates for 
intrastate telecommunications services are outweighed by the 
extra efficiency losses from general goods and services: excess 
burden would increase enormously under Scenario E. 
Inefficiency increases in Scenario E because demand for 
telecommunications services tends to be more inelastic than for 
other goods and services. Recall that telecommunications ser­
vices are currently not subject to state sales tax, and that the 
cumulative tax rate on intrastate services is about 7.8 percent, 
close to the state sales tax rate. Thus in Scenario E, starting from 
a point of roughly equal tax rates for telecommunications 
services and other goods, we raise the tax rate on the relatively 
elastic good (non-telecommunications goods) and lower it on 
the inelastic good (telecommunications). That is the opposite 
direction of rebalancing toward optimal rates. Once again, 
broadening the tax base does not necessarily improve consumer 
welfare when there are other taxes already in existence. 
We close this section noting some caveats regarding 
Scenario E. Recall that we have not included the producer side 
of the excess-burden calculation. If we did, and if price-cost 
16
 The current sales tax base was taken to be $440 billion, based on an 
extrapolation of available data for 2001 (California State BOE, Taxable Sales 
in California (Sales & Use Tax), 2001, 1st and 2nd quarter). 
margins are higher in telecommunications than they are for 
other goods and services, then the efficiency gains from the 
telecommunications services in Scenario E would be relatively 
larger. Given that we do not have data on margins, we cannot 
pursue this avenue. Furthermore, if we had data on revenue 
from newer services such as DSL and cable modem service, 
which have higher elasticity of demand, the efficiency gains 
from the telecommunications services in Scenario E would also 
be relatively larger. 
Finally, it is important to note that if we use the maximum 
intrastate rate of 15.83 percent (state tax + FET + UUT of 11 
percent), then expanding the tax base as in Scenario E may 
reduce the excess burden from taxation. Whether it does 
depends on the tax revenue requirement assumed. The more tax 
revenue that must be raised to “pay off” localities in lieu of their 
UUT revenue, the higher the final uniform tax rate must be, and 
the lower the potential efficiency gains.17 Therefore, the poten­
tial gains from expanding the tax base to include all sales-tax­
able revenue depend on both the extent to which policymakers 
17
 In particular, if the revenue requirement is kept at $777 million (the 
amount raised by current state telecom taxes), as it is in Scenario E, replacing 
the existing state and local telecommunications taxes of 15.83 percent with a 
uniform lower rate of 0.17 percent decreases excess burden by $9.8 million. 
However, if the revenue requirement is increased to $2.548 billion (the amount 
raised by the assumed 15.83 percent state and local tax rate on intrastate 
revenue), replacing the existing state and local telecommunications taxes of 
15.83 percent with a uniform lower rate of 0.56 percent increases excess burden 
by $126 million. 
(C)
 Tax Analysts 2003. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
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Table 3 
Changes in Excess Burden (Efficiency Loss) Through Expanding the Tax Base 
Scenario Service 
Demand 
Elasticity 
Revenue 
($M) 
Current 
State Tax 
Rate 
Current 
Federal 
Tax Rate 
Proposed 
State 
Telecom 
Tax Rate 
Proposed 
Cumulative 
Tax Rate 
Incremental 
Excess 
Burden 
($M) 
D 
A
dd
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rs
ta
te
 
Te
le
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
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n
s
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e 
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at
e 
Te
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m
 
Ta
x
 B
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e
Intrastate
Revenue 
Local 
Exchange 
Access* 0.02 6,764 4.83% 3.00% 3.51% 6.51% -0.13 
IntraLATA Toll 0.40 1,282 4.83% 3.00% 3.51% 6.51% -0.49 
InterLATA 
Intrastate Toll 0.72 3,858 4.83% 3.00% 3.51% 6.51% -2.63 
Mobile 
Wireless 0.51 4,193 4.83% 3.00% 3.51% 6.51% -2.03 
Subtotal 16,097 -5.27 
Interstate
Revenue 
Interstate Toll 0.72 490 — 10.28% 3.51% 13.79% 1.06 
Mobile 
Wireless 0.51 5,499 — 10.28% 3.51% 13.79% 16.72 
Subtotal 5,989 17.77 
Total 22,086 12.50 
E 
A
dd
 A
ll 
Sa
le
s-
Ta
x
ab
le
 
R
ev
en
u
e
to
 
St
at
e 
Te
le
co
m
 
Ta
x
 
B
as
e 
Sales Taxable Revenue 440,000 7.50% 0.00% 0.17% 7.67% 56.95 
Intrastate
Revenue 
Local 
Exchange 
Access* 0.02 6,764 4.83% 3.00% 0.17% 3.17% -0.09 
IntraLATA Toll 0.40 1,282 4.83% 3.00% 0.17% 3.17% -0.34 
InterLATA 
Intrastate Toll 0.72 3,858 4.83% 3.00% 0.17% 3.17% -1.84 
Mobile 
Wireless 0.51 4,193 4.83% 3.00% 0.17% 3.17% -1.42 
Subtotal 16,097 -3.69 
Total 
456,097 53.26 
* Revenue for local exchange access includes CLEC revenue. 
Notes: “Current State Tax Rate” for sales-taxable revenue includes the 7.25 percent state sales tax and an assumed 0.25 percent local 
assessment. See notes to Table 11. 
(C)
 Tax Analysts 2003. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content. 
are willing and able to reform the current system, and on the 
tax revenue requirement. Were this option to be pursued, 
analysis of the gains from expanding the tax base should be 
further explored on a proposal-by-proposal basis. 
Dynamic Efficiency and Horizontal Equity
Among Providers 
The preceding paragraphs dealt with questions of static 
efficiency, in which technology and consumers’ preference are 
taken as given. Over time, however, technology and prefer­
ences change. Technology changes as firms invest and in­
novate, and tastes change as consumers learn about and become 
comfortable with new products and services. When technology 
and tastes change merely because taxes distort the prices that 
consumers face and the profits firms receive, then questions of 
dynamic efficiency arise. Here we focus on the potential 
problems for investment incentives that unequal taxation of 
telecommunications firms might cause. 
The theory of efficient investment and taxation. The eco­
nomic theory of how taxation affects investment and dynamic 
efficiency is large, but a few principles stand out. First, dynamic 
productive efficiency requires that the rates of return be equal­
ized across assets. Required for this is equalization of effective 
tax rates across assets (where effective tax rates are a function 
of pre- and post-tax rates of return).18 Second, productive 
efficiency is generally desirable, even when distortionary taxa­
tion (such as revenue taxation, which changes asset prices) 
must be used.19 
18
 Jack and Viard (1996). 
19
 Productive efficiency is required for absolute economic efficiency (what 
economists term the “first best”). Even when distortionary taxes (those that 
change assets’ values and prices) are unavoidable, the “second best” — the 
most efficient outcome possible, given that distortionary taxation must be used 
— also requires productive efficiency under certain conditions (Diamond and 
Mirrlees, 1971). Even when those technical conditions are not satisfied, 
moving toward productive efficiency generally improves economic welfare 
(Auerbach 1982, 1989). Thus, productive efficiency is generally desirable 
under a wide range of circumstances. 
State Tax Notes, September 15, 2003 774 
  
 
    
   
 
    
    
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
     
 
   
 
   
     
    
   
 
 
  
 
 
    
  
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
  
    
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
Special Report / Viewpoint 
Various forms of taxation (corporate income taxes, sales 
taxes, revenue taxes, property taxes, per-line fees, etc.) affect 
the rates of return on assets through at least two channels.20 
First, taxes can change the “user cost of capital,” which is the 
opportunity cost of investing in a particular capital good. The 
user cost of capital might change because a tax investment 
credit (such as the manufacturers’ investment credit (MIC) in 
California) changes the effective purchase price of capital, or 
because taxes lower net cash flows resulting from the invest­
ment (through corporate income taxes, for example). Second, 
the rate of return on an asset is lowered when the (net) price of 
the output service produced with the asset falls, due to taxation 
of revenue or sales. 
Therefore, the tax system will cause an efficiency loss if it 
discriminates among telecommunications firms (based on the 
technology used to deliver telecommunications services), or 
between telecommunications companies and other companies, 
in ways that change their rates of return. By altering the rates 
of return on investment, taxes can distort the growth of the 
telecommunications industry. For example, everything else 
being equal, more resources will be devoted to the least-taxed 
technology than would be in the absence of taxation. 
Horizontal equity among telecommunications firms. There 
is evidence that the existing tax structure does not affect all 
types of telecommunications providers equally. Traditional 
providers of telecommunications services, such as telephone 
companies, are subject to a much broader range of federal, 
state, and local communications taxes than are some of their 
new competitors, such as cable or satellite providers. Con­
sumers of cable or satellite services do not pay the FET or the 
myriad federal and state taxes and charges to support universal 
service. Some local governments do, however, include cable 
services in their UUT base. 
There are currently no data available to 
measure the extent to which consumers are 
s u bs titu ting I n te r n e t for tr ad itio nal 
te le c o mmunic a tio ns , but it  is s u r e to 
increase with improvements in the quality 
and ease of use of Internet telephony. 
The current funding mechanisms for state and federal 
universal service treat different providers of voice communi­
cation more equally. For example, if a cable company offers 
local exchange service, it must register with the California 
Public Utilities Commission as a competitive local exchange 
carrier and then becomes subject to universal-service taxes. 
The largest potential “leakage” with respect to voice commu­
nications is Internet telephony. As described in the introductory 
section (and in Appendix A of the full CPRC report, “The 
History of Telecommunications in California: From Monopoly 
to Deregulation, a March Toward Technological Conver­
gence”), Internet telephony may be a substitute for the tradi­
20
 This paragraph follows Auerbach (1983). See his article for an explicit 
equation for the rate of return of a taxed asset. 
tional telephone network, and calling may be accomplished by 
the end-users themselves without any company contributing to 
universal service involved. If the universal-service tax rates 
keep rising, this leakage of tax revenue can only be expected 
to increase as Internet telephony becomes more accessible and 
user-friendly. 
If the tax system discriminates based on the technology used 
to deliver telecommunications services, then the dynamic ef­
ficiency losses discussed in the previous subsection (The theory 
of efficient investment and taxation) will result. Unfortunately, 
we do not have the data (or an accepted methodology from the 
literature) to estimate the magnitude of these potential losses 
over time. Suffice it to say that dynamic losses are often much 
larger than static-efficiency losses, given that the effects of 
distortions compound over time, and that the potential welfare 
is higher when technology and the product mix can change. 
In Appendix D of the full report, “Comparison of Telecom­
munications Tax Obligations,” we summarize the distinctions 
that the current system of taxation makes between telecom­
munications firms. As in the rest of this report, we focus on 
providers of two-way voice communication. Table D-1 in the 
appendix provides a comparison of the local, state, and federal 
taxes imposed on different types of telecommunications busi­
nesses in California. All telecommunications businesses, 
regardless of technology, are treated similarly regarding the 
state sales tax and the corporate franchise (income) tax. Dis­
crimination across technologies occurs in the imposition of the 
numerous federal, state, and local taxes, surcharges, and fees 
based on end-user revenues, and the property tax. 
State regulatory surcharges, taxes, and fees are imposed on 
the intrastate end-user revenues of all traditional wireline local 
and long-distance service providers in the state, as well as 
wireless mobile service providers. Similarly, all interstate end-
user revenues of these providers are subject to the FET and 
federal universal-service fees. Paging (and other one-way com­
munications services) and payphone services are exempt from 
the state (but not the federal) taxes. The local UUT also applies 
to intrastate, interstate, and wireless services in most jurisdic­
tions that impose the tax. (See the second section of the full 
report, “Overview of Current State and Local Telecommunica­
tions Taxes in California,” and Appendix C, “Utility User Tax 
Information”). 
Internet-telephony services escape all of these taxes and 
consequently enjoy a competitive advantage. Consumers of 
telecommunication services, particularly interstate services, 
have an incentive to switch to Internet-based telephony to avoid 
the high combined tax rate on traditional services. In the second 
section, we found that this rate is as high as 25.5 percent in 
some California cities. Recall that such tax-induced distortions 
in consumption lead to efficiency losses. In particular, the 
availability of a close substitute to traditional telecommunica­
tions services increases the price elasticity21 of demand for 
traditional services and, hence, the excess burden due to taxa­
tion. 
There are currently no data available to measure the extent 
to which consumers are substituting Internet for traditional 
telecommunications, but it is sure to increase with improve­
21 See footnote 7. 
(C)
 Tax Analysts 2003. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content. 
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Special Report / Viewpoint 
ments in the quality and ease of use of Internet telephony. 
Another consequence of concern to federal, state, and local 
governments is the decline in revenue from these various taxes 
and the potential impact on the programs they fund. 
Another potential source of discriminatory tax treatment is 
the local franchise fee. Cable companies pay franchise fees for 
the privilege of providing specialized services, as well as for 
the right to use public rights of way to lay their cables. In 
contrast, LECs are exempted by the state from paying such 
fees. However, as was previously mentioned, this exemption 
has been recently challenged as telephone companies have 
expanded to offer cable and information services. This dis­
criminatory treatment and uncertainty regarding the exemption 
may result in dynamic efficiency losses if local telephone 
companies delay — or are discouraged from adding — cable 
services for fear of losing their state franchise exemption. 
An ar gu men t coul d b e m ade for either 
annual state assessment at market value for 
all telecommunications companies, defined 
broadly to include all companies providing 
competitive services, or local assessment for 
all. 
Telecommunications companies are also treated differently 
under California’s property tax laws. Currently cable television 
companies are locally assessed, while most telecommunica­
tions companies (LECs, CLECs, wireless) are state-assessed. 
Although there is no evidence that the current assessed values 
of either type of company would change significantly if their 
assessment status were switched, the perception of either cur­
rent or future differences may influence firm activity. For 
example, a cable television company contemplating offering 
telecommunications services might be discouraged from doing 
so because it fears higher property taxes as a consequence. All 
of the taxable property of the cable company would be centrally 
assessed, not just the portion affiliated with the offering of 
telecommunications services. If the entire company was sub­
jected to state assessment, it would lose whatever Proposition 
13 protection that it had, either real or perceived. This reluc­
tance may be justified if the market value of the company’s real 
assets is expected to increase faster than 2 percent a year. 
By a similar argument, the cable company that is currently 
locally assessed may be able to maintain a property tax ad­
vantage over any potential new entrant due to the acquisition 
value basis of assessment. Thus, to foster competition and level 
the playing field regarding property tax obligations, an argu­
ment could be made for either annual state assessment at 
market value for all telecommunications companies, defined 
broadly to include all companies providing competitive ser­
vices, or local assessment for all. 
Either solution, however, could have a significant impact on 
local government revenues because, under current law, proper­
ty tax revenues from state-assessed and locally-assessed 
property are allocated much differently. State-assessed unitary 
values are allocated by the BOE to a countywide tax rate area 
in each county where the assessed has property. These revenues 
are then allocated by statutory formula to all local entities 
within the county. Revenues from county-assessed property, on 
the other hand, are distributed only to those local jurisdictions 
in which the particular property is situated. Therefore, a shift 
of all telecommunications companies to either state or local 
assessment would affect property tax receipts of local govern­
ments. 
The issue of state versus local assessment has been recently 
addressed by the BOE as it applies to the electricity industry. 
In the board’s most recent ruling, amended Rule 905, it was 
decided that all large electricity-generating facilities should 
be state-assessed. A law recently enacted in California re­
quires that the revenues derived from the assessment of this 
property be allocated in the same manner as revenues derived 
from locally assessed properties.22 This solution levels the 
playing field between existing and new electricity-generating 
facilities and provides at least a modicum of incentive for local 
governments to site these facilities within their borders. 
Horizontal equity between telecommunications and other 
businesses. Many of the state and local taxes imposed on 
telecommunications providers and their customers are unique 
taxes that do not apply to other businesses. Cline (2002) es­
timates that current taxes paid by telecommunications com­
panies and their customers in California are three times higher 
than the taxes they would pay if they were taxed under the same 
state and local system that applies to general businesses.23 
California ranks third highest, among all states, in Cline’s 
measure of tax inequity between telecommunications firms and 
other companies. 
State assessment of telecommunications companies appears 
to single out the telecommunications industry for adverse tax 
treatment, compared to other businesses in the state. If telecom­
munications companies are subject to state assessment at 
market value, while other businesses are locally assessed (with 
Proposition 13 protection), then the rates of return of these two 
groups are distorted and productive efficiency is impaired. 
The MIC, unavailable to telecommuni­
cation s com panies, als o dis advan tages 
t e l e co m m u ni ca t i o n s fi rm s rel a t i ve t o 
companies in other lines of business. 
The MIC, unavailable to telecommunications companies, 
also disadvantages telecommunications firms relative to com­
panies in other lines of business. In addition to the arguments 
for extending the MIC to telecommunications companies that 
we discussed in the full report in “Overview of Current State 
and Local Telecommunications Taxes in California,” we can 
now add productive efficiency to the list. Optimal investment 
tax credits equalize rates of return on assets.24 Thus, unless 
22
 AB 81, signed June 20, 2002; chaptered at sections 100.9 and 721.5 of 
the California Revenue and Taxation Code. (For the full text of AB 81, see Doc 
2002-15358 (3 original pages) or 2002 STT 128-4.) 
23
 These excess tax calculations exclude corporate income and franchise 
taxes, do not consider potential differences in business property assessments 
or property tax depreciation schedules, and assume that telecommunication 
services would continue to be exempt from the state and local sales tax. 
24
 Jack and Viard (1996). 
(C)
 Tax Analysts 2003. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content. 
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Table 4 
Comparison of Telecommunications Transaction Taxes in California and Selected States 
State 
Number of 
Local Taxes 
Number of 
State Taxes 
Total Tax 
Rate 
Number of 
Tax Bases 
Number of 
Returns 
Arizona 3 5 0.1313 18 205 
California 2 7 0.1228 17 2,440 
Florida 1 1 0.163 1 1 
Nevada 6 3 0.0289 7 194 
New Mexico 13 8 0.0853 23 120 
New York 5 8 0.1726 10 5,623 
Oregon 1 4 0.132 86 1,017 
Texas 3 8 0.2856 4 3,107 
Washington 8 5 0.1926 12 4,446 
National Average 3 4 0.139 54 1,312 
(risk-adjusted) rates of return for telecommunications com­
panies are believed to be higher than for manufacturers in 
general, telecommunications companies should be extended 
the same investment credit. While ILECs might enjoy higher 
rates of return than some manufacturers, CLECs (at this time) 
almost certainly do not, and face higher risk as well. 
Concluding Remarks on Efficiency 
To conclude this section on efficiency, we again emphasize 
that the inefficiencies of the current tax system are only the cost 
side of a full cost-benefit analysis. Although taxes impose 
efficiency costs on the economy, they may be warranted by the 
programs they fund. Against the costs of the tax system, then, 
must be weighed the purported benefits ensuing from the 
distribution of the tax revenue. 
California is tied with Colorado, Illinois, and 
Louisiana for the second-highest number of 
state taxes on telecommunications sales 
nationwide: seven. 
For example, the excess burden generated by universal-
service taxes and surcharges should be compared to the bene­
fits of these programs. A recent FCC report shows that the 
CPUC has exceeded its goal of a 95 percent penetration rate in 
California. It is reported that 97 percent or more of all Califor­
nia households were subscribing to telephone service in 2001, 
almost 2 percentage points above the national average of 95.1 
percent.25 The benefits of this network expansion are, however, 
not easily measured, and there is little evidence that the size of 
the network would decrease much if the universal-service 
programs were not in effect. See Appendix E of the full report, 
“Universal Service in California,” for more detailed informa­
tion on the ubiquity of basic local exchange service in Califor­
nia. 
25
 Belinfante (2002), tables 1 and 2, pp. 6 and 8. 
Even if policymakers or society determines that the benefits 
of programs funded under the current tax system outweigh the 
costs, the message from our calculations above is that the same 
benefits could be realized more efficiently. Whatever the tax-
revenue requirements are determined to be, rebalancing the tax 
rates, reducing administrative complexity, and leveling the 
playing field for different types of telecommunications firms 
can improve the efficiency of the tax system. 
California Compared With Other States 
In our earlier discussion on administrative simplicity, we 
noted that an overly complex tax system may be economically 
inefficient. How does California measure up to other states with 
regard to telecommunications taxation?26 Some dimensions 
along which to judge the complexity of the state’s tax system 
are the number of distinct taxes, the overall level of the taxes, 
the number of tax bases, and the number of taxing jurisdictions. 
The number of taxes is the number of legally distinct telecom­
munications taxes. For example, the Universal Lifeline 
Telephone Service charge and the California High-Cost Fund-
A fee are two different state taxes (where we are using the term 
“taxes” to include all taxes, fees, and surcharges). The overall 
level of the taxes is the sum of the rates of all the various taxes. 
The base of a tax is the specific set of services to which the tax 
applies. For example, the base for the state universal-service 
taxes is all intrastate services, while the base for a utility user 
tax may be local and long-distance calling revenue, but not 
cellular revenue.27 Finally, the number of taxing jurisdictions 
is the number of legal, governmental, or administrative entities 
that tax telecommunications.28 Because each jurisdiction re­
quires at least one tax return to be filed, the more jurisdictions 
there are, the more tax returns need to be filed. 
The overall picture shows that California has a relatively high 
number of state taxes and jurisdictions, although it does not have 
a relatively high average tax rate. The following data are obtained 
26
 This section draws on COST (2002a, 2002b). 
27 See Appendix C in full report for the many ways the utility user tax base 
is defined in the state. 
28
 Taxing jurisdictions include the state, counties, cities, and special tax 
districts. 
(C)
 Tax Analysts 2003. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content. 
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from the 2001 COST report and the Ernst & Young LLP report 
(Cline, 2002), to which we added clarifications. Table 4  (pre­
vious page) provides a summary of this information. 
Number of Local Taxes. California has two local taxes 
that apply to revenues from the sale of telecommunica­
tions services: the utility user tax (UUT) and the local 
franchise fee. Although California does have a statewide 
local sales tax and local-option sales tax, these apply only 
to equipment, not services.29 Nationwide, the average 
number of local taxes is three. Thirty-six states have more 
than California — the highest being New Mexico with 
13. Among the neighboring states, only Oregon, with 
one, has fewer than California. Arizona has three, while 
Nevada has six. New York has five; Texas has three. 
Number of State Taxes. California is tied with Colorado, 
Illinois, and Louisiana for the second-highest number of 
state taxes on telecommunications sales nationwide: 
seven.30 Only New Mexico, New York, and Texas have 
more, each with eight. Arizona and Washington each 
have five, Oregon has four, and Nevada has three. The 
national average is four. 
Total Number of Taxes. California is tied with Mississip­
pi, Nevada, and Virginia for the sixth-highest number of 
total taxes on telecommunications sales nationwide: 
nine. New Mexico leads the nation with 21, while New 
York, Washington, and Illinois each have 13. Texas has 
11, Nevada 9, Arizona 8, and Oregon 5. 
Total Tax Rate. California’s total state and local tax rate 
on telecommunications sales (which COST calculates to 
be an average of 12.28 percent) is just below the median 
rate among all states, and is below the 13.9 percent 
national average.31 However, as mentioned before, the 
state and local tax rate can range from 4.83 to 15.83 
percent on intrastate services and from 7.28 to 18.28 
percent on interstate services, depending on the UUT. 
Among neighboring states, Oregon (13.2 percent) and 
Arizona (13.13 percent) have slightly higher average tax 
rates than California. Nevada has a combined state-local 
rate of 2.89 percent. The highest rates nationwide are in 
Virginia, with 29.77 percent, and Texas, with 28.56 per­
cent. Washington also makes the top 10, with 19.26 
percent. New York’s rate is 17.26 percent. 
Excess Tax Rates. If telecommunications were taxed like 
any other service in the state, taxes on the industry would 
be only one-quarter their present amount. Most of this 
difference is due to the fact that services, in general, are 
not subject to the sales and use tax. In this sense, about 
75 percent of all telecommunications taxes in the state 
are excess taxes that exceed taxes generally imposed on 
29
 COST (2000a) reports that California has four local taxes that apply to 
telecommunications sales. They include the local sales tax and a local 911 
emergency per-line fee imposed only within the city and county of San 
Francisco. 
30
 COST (2002a) reports California with eight, but they include the state 
sales tax, which applies only to equipment, not services. 
31
 Using different methodology, Cline (2002) estimates that total state and 
local telecommunications taxes in California are 6.4 percent of industry reve­
nue, which puts the state in the lowest decile. 
other service-sector businesses and their customers. 
Only Montana, New Hampshire, and the District of 
Columbia, have higher excess tax percentages. Of neigh­
boring states, only Oregon (with 74 percent excess taxes) 
ranks near California. Arizona and Nevada both have 
excess taxes below the national average of 39 percent. 
Total Tax Bases That Must Be Maintained. California 
ranks 11th in terms of total tax bases that must be main­
tained by telecommunications companies with 17, 15 of 
which are local tax bases. This is the highest number of 
tax bases among the 10 largest states. The neighboring 
states of Oregon, with 86, and Arizona, with 18, both beat 
California. Missouri earns the number one spot with 781. 
Washington has 12, New York 10, Nevada 7, and Texas 
4. The national average is 54, and the national median is 
six. 
Number of Tax Returns and Taxing Jurisdictions. 
California ranks eighth in the nation in total number of 
tax returns that must be filed by telecommunications 
companies: 2,440. California ranks seventh in the num­
ber of taxing jurisdictions, with 824. The national 
average number of tax returns and taxing jurisdictions is 
1,312 and 298, respectively. 
Thus, as shown by its high rankings in many of these 
categories, California appears to be ripe for simplification of 
its telecommunications tax system. Even though the tax rates 
are not out of line with other states, the large number of taxes, 
tax bases, and particularly jurisdictions leads to administrative 
complexity, with its attendant costs, as previously mentioned. 
Reforms 
In this section we describe recent telecommunication tax-
reform efforts by the federal government and other states as 
well as reforms proposed by various interest groups and 
stakeholders. 
Recent Reforms 
Recent reform efforts, mostly outside California, include the 
following (in chronological order). 
In a 1994 suit, MCI claimed that it had been denied equal 
protection under the personal property tax law in Ohio.32 
MCI’s personal property was taxed at 88 percent of 
market value, while the property of its competitors was 
taxed at 31 percent of market value. In February 1994, 
the state supreme court ruled in favor of MCI, stating that 
it should be taxed similarly to other businesses. In addi­
tion, a comprehensive tax reform study was undertaken 
in 1994 that included a detailed analysis of Ohio’s 
telecommunications taxes. Effective in 1995, personal 
property of long-distance companies is assessed at 25 
percent of value. Property of local exchange carriers 
added to the tax rolls during 1995 and thereafter is also 
assessed at 25 percent. All existing property — property 
on the tax rolls before 1995 — will continue to be 
assessed at 88 percent of value. Property of competitive 
32 MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Limbach, Tax Commr., 68 Ohio St. 
3d 195; 1994 Ohio 489; 625 N.E.2d 597 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1994). (For the 
full text of the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision, see 94 STN 42-22.) 
(C)
 Tax Analysts 2003. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content. 
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Special Report / Viewpoint 
local phone companies will be assessed in the same 
manner as that of the incumbent local providers.33 
In 1996, New York undertook a major review of telecom­
munications taxes in response to successful litigation 
brought by AT&T.34 This state has since modernized its 
statutes. 
Kentucky’s Task Force on Utility Tax Policy commis­
sioned Barents Group, a consulting firm, to provide 
background information and analyze the taxation issues 
related to the deregulation of utilities and the communi­
cations industry.35 
Maine created a task force to study telecommunications 
taxation in 1997. The task force was asked to review the 
state’s sales and personal property taxes as they apply to 
telecommunications businesses, identify disparities 
among service providers, compare the tax treatment of 
telecommunications firms with that of other firms, and 
evaluate strategies to clarify laws and ease adminis­
tration. Their report was published in 1999. 
In 1999, Montana reduced property taxes for large 
telecommunications providers and introduced a new ex­
cise tax on all providers to cover the lost revenue. Before 
this change, the property of large telecommunications 
companies was centrally assessed and taxed at the rate of 
12 percent. In contrast, the property of smaller telecom­
munications providers was not centrally assessed and 
was taxed at 6 percent. The 1999 legislation reduced the 
taxable valuation rate of centrally assessed telecom­
munications property from 12 to 6 percent. It also imple­
mented a broad-based telecommunications excise tax, 
set at a rate of 3.75 percent of the sales price of telecom­
munications services, to offset the lost property tax reve­
nue. Three-quarters of the excise tax revenues are cur­
rently used to reimburse local governments for lost 
property tax revenue, and 25 percent goes into the state’s 
general fund. 
South Carolina passed legislation in 1999 allowing cities 
to collect franchise fees from local providers through 
2003. Companies that were not required to pay franchise 
fees, such as wireless providers, were assessed a 0.3 
percent business tax. 
In a coordinated effort that extended over a three-year 
period, the wi reless telecommunications industry 
worked with a number of state and local government 
organizations (including the National Governors’ As­
sociation, the National Conference of State Legislatures, 
the Federation of Tax Administrators, the Multistate Tax 
Commission, and the National League of Cities) to pur­
sue federal legislation that provides a uniform method to 
determine the situs36 of a cellular telephone call for tax 
purposes. The Mobile Telecommunications Sourcing Act 
33
 McHugh (1996). 
34 See http://www.tax.state.ny.us/Statistics/Policy-Special/Telco/Back­
ground/Telco-Back_Contents.htm. 
35 See Barents Group (1999). 
36
 The location of property, for purposes of determining whether a given 
property tax applies. 
(P.L. 106-252) was signed into law on July 28, 2000.37 
The act addresses the sourcing problem by sourcing all 
wireless calls and mobile telecommunications services 
to the “place of primary use,” which is essentially the 
user’s address. To date, 16 states, including California, 
have enacted conforming legislation. Only the state or 
local taxing jurisdictions encompassing the place of 
primary use can tax the calls or service. 
In one of the most sweeping reforms to date, Florida 
repealed 11 separate taxes and fees and replaced them 
with a single state and a single local communications 
services tax in 2000. During 2001, the state enacted 
follow-up legislation establishing a revenue-neutral tax 
rate for the replacement taxes. The new taxes became 
effective October 1, 2001. 
In 2001, North Carolina eliminated the gross receipts tax 
imposed on local communications services, changed the 
sales tax rate to 6 percent on all taxable telecommunica­
tions services, and expanded the base of the sales tax on 
communications services.38 
Minnesota enacted legislation in 2001 providing for a 
sales tax exemption for machinery and equipment used 
to provide telecommunications services.39 
Also in 2001, Tennessee eliminated the discriminatory 
property tax treatment of local communications carriers 
and increased the sales tax on telecommunications ser­
vices.40 
Legislation to repeal the 3 percent FET was introduced 
during 2001 in both the House and Senate, but no action 
has been taken. 
Illinois enacted the Simplified Municipal Telecom­
munications Tax Act on February 8, 2002. This legisla­
tion replaced three municipal taxes with a new centrally 
administered “simplified municipal telecommunications 
tax” and also provided for a vendor compensations 
allowance.41 
Reform Proposals 
Below we describe and comment on some of the more 
c om mon reforms that have bee n proposed by various 
policymakers, task forces, interest groups, and stakeholders. 
Corporate Franchise Tax 
In 1997, the California Franchise Tax Board (FTB) is­
sued draft regulations to provide special apportionment 
rules for telecommunications and related businesses in 
an attempt to have the property factor include key assets 
of these companies and what the FTB perceived as a 
more appropriate sourcing rule for sales.42 
37 For the text of the act, see http://www.wow-com.com/pdf/uniform_072800.pdf. 
38
 2001 North Carolina HB 571, SB 1005. (For  the full text of HB 571, see 
Doc 2001-11930 (16 original pages) or 2001 STT 88-14.) 
39
 2001 Minnesota HF 1. (For the full text of HF 1, see Doc 2001-22347 
(433 original pages) or 2001 STT 165-18.) 
40
 Tennessee SB 1484, HB 864, enacted as Pub. Ch. 195. (For the full text 
of HB 864, see Doc 2001-13281 (22 original pages) or 2001 STT 97-36.) 
41
 2001 Illinois SB 88, enacted as P.A. 92-0526. (For the full text of SB 88, 
see Doc 2001-29019 (98 original pages) or 2001 STT 226-11.) 
42 See “Overview of Current State and Local Telecommunications Taxes 
in California” in the full report for the details of this proposal. 
(C)
 Tax Analysts 2003. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content. 
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There have been various proposals and suggestions to 
update P.L. 86-272 to provide guidance on when a mul­
tistate business is subject to any state tax and to apply the 
guidance to more than just businesses that sell tangible 
goods. For example, the federal Advisory Commission 
on E l e c t r oni c Com m e r c e propos e d ne w ne xu s 
guidelines, and a few bills have been introduced in 
Congress over the years, such as S.664 (107th Congress). 
COST and others43 have suggested that more states 
should provide sales tax exemptions for equipment pur­
chased by telecommunications companies. California 
has a limited sales tax exemption that only applies to 
certain new businesses and not to telecommunications 
companies. In lieu of a sales tax exemption, California 
has a manufacturers’ investment credit (MIC) that ap­
plies against state franchise taxes. However, this credit 
also does not apply to telecommunications companies. 
Various groups have suggested that the MIC be expanded 
to also apply to telecommunications service providers 
(see discussion below on the sales tax exemption). 
Sales and Use Tax 
Extend sales and use tax exemptions and income tax 
credits (the MIC) for manufacturing equipment to equip­
ment used to provide telecommunications services.44 
Over the years, there have been suggestions to broaden 
the sales tax base and lower the rate. Such a change 
eliminates the need to deal with problematic exemptions 
because every sale would be subject to taxation. Some 
have proposed, along with the broader base, that a sales 
tax exemption be granted to purchases by businesses to 
eliminate cascading of the tax.45 Should such a proposal 
be considered in California, it would be useful to analyze 
whether the broader base (including telecommunication 
services) could produce revenues to replace the multi­
tude of current taxes and fees that apply to telecom­
munications. 
Property Tax 
Assess all business property, including that of telecom­
munication companies, at market value. This would 
eliminate the potential differences in treatment of state 
versus local assessees, and the attendant possible 
dynamic inefficiencies discussed earlier. Assessment of 
all business property at market value would also remove 
the artificial advantage that older locally assessed 
property enjoys over newer locally assessed property. 
Keep depreciation rate schedules up to date to best reflect 
rapid technological change. 
Franchise Fees 
Various groups have suggested eliminating the multitude of 
fees and taxes imposed on telecommunications services and 
43 See “Proposal For State and Local Taxation of the Telecommunications 
Industry,” submitted to the Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce on 
November 15, 1999, by 12 telecommunications companies, available online at 
http://www.ecommercecommission.org/proposal.htm; and Palladino and 
Mazer (2000), p. 20. 
44
 COST (2002a) and Palladino and Mazer (2000). 
45 See McLure (1999). 
replacing them with either a single tax, or a single state tax and 
single local tax.46 As explained by the National Governors’ 
Association: 
States need to examine the patchwork of local taxes and 
fees imposed on telecommunications firms. Most states 
grant the authority to impose these taxes and fees by 
statute, and, therefore, states can make any necessary 
changes. One step states can take is to consolidate the 
number of fees and taxes imposed, possibly collapsing 
them into one local fee to cover all expenses incurred by 
local governments to manage rights-of-way. This could 
be done as local revenue is maintained while simplifying 
fee administration.47 
Utility User Tax 
As with franchise fees, various groups have suggested 
eliminating the multitude of fees and taxes imposed on 
telecommunications services and replacing them with 
just one or two taxes. 
Provide a uniform base across all jurisdictions that levy 
the telephone user’s tax. 
Universal Service 
Expand the definition of universal service to include 
“advanced,” “enhanced,” and “information” services 
such as Internet access.48 Widespread deployment of 
broadband services, particularly in areas with high con­
centrations of minority and low-income households, has 
become a principal policy objective of the FCC.49 Expan­
sion of the broadband network, and increased access to 
it, is claimed to bring valuable new services to con­
sumers, stimulate economic activity, improve national 
productivity, and advance economic opportunity for all 
Americans. Congress has explicitly charged the FCC to 
“encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely 
basis” of broadband capabilities to “all Americans,” and 
gave the FCC authority to “take immediate action to 
accelerate deployment of such capability by removing 
barriers to infrastructure investment,” if necessary.50 A 
RAND study recommended that an expanded universal-
service basic package include a “plain text message” 
e-mail exchange program for all eligible households.51 
Determining the value of expanding universal-service 
support is beyond the scope of this report. However, we 
46 See proposals of the majority of the ACEC (in the full report, “Overview 
of Current State and Local Telecommunications Taxes in California,” above); 
the National Governors’ Association (“Streamlining State Sales Tax Systems,” 
a proposal to the ACEC, 1999, available at http://www.ecommercecommis­
sion.org/document/NGAPolicy.doc); and the proposal by 12 telecommunica­
t ions compani e s ( “ Pr oposal fo r St ate and Lo cal T a xa t ion of the 
Telecommunications Industry,” Nov. 15, 1999, available at http://www.ecom­
mercecommission.org/document/StateAndLocalTaxation124.doc). 
47
 Palladino and Mazer (2000). 
48
 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires the FCC to periodically 
review the definition of “universal service” to reflect changes in technology 
and market demand. 
49
 For an exploration of whether the racial, ethnic, and income composition 
of an area actually affects the probability of broadband availability, after 
controlling for demand and cost factors, see Prieger (2003). 
50
 Sections 706(a) and (b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 
51
 Anderson, et al. (1995). 
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Special Report / Viewpoint 
note that many economists have argued strenuously 
against expanding universal-service subsidies (for ex­
ample, Crandall and Waverman, 2000). Another argu­
ment often given for expanding the definition of “univer­
sal service” is concern over future revenues if voice 
traffic migrates to broadband Internet platforms. 
Finance universal service from general fund revenues 
similar to other welfare and social programs. Given that 
universal service is essentially a welfare program, 
telecommunications providers and customers should not 
bear its burden. As discussed in the section on social and 
economic consequences of existing telecommunications 
tax policy, one cannot logically use the benefit principle 
to support telecommunications-specific taxation for 
universal service. 
Finance universal service from flat-rate or per-line 
charges instead of ad valorem charges. A flat-rate charge, 
independent of the quantity or length of calls or other 
connections, would result in fewer consumption distor­
tions and a lower efficiency cost. 
Eliminate universal-service subsidies altogether. The 
most common arguments include the following: (1) 
Competition and new technologies have lowered the cost 
of telecommunications services, so that most people have 
affordable access to basic telecommunications services. 
(2) Justifications based on network externalities over­
state the benefit to society of bringing marginal sub­
scribers onto the network. (3) The government should not 
select the services that receive subsidies and thereby 
influence the path or speed of innovation. Universal-ser­
vice subsidies discourage the deployment of new tech­
nologies since they have to compete with existing sub­
sidized technologies. 
As discussed in the section on equity and efficiency, we are 
not unsympathetic to some of these arguments. The last point 
touches on dynamic inefficiency, which we discussed in that 
same section. 
Eliminate high-cost subsidies. Wireless and satellite 
technology have lowered the cost of providing service to 
rura l a nd pre vio us ly hi gh-c os t a re a s . As m a ny 
economists have argued elsewhere (for example, Prieger 
1998), subsidizing an area makes little sense compared 
with subsidizing targeted individuals. 
Federal Telecommunications Taxes 
There have been several attempts to repeal the outdated and 
burdensome 3 percent FET on telecommunications. 
Administration 
Various proposals have been offered to simplify adminis­
tration and compliance with the multitude of telecommunica­
tions taxes. These suggestions include having only one trans­
action tax per state (or perhaps one local transaction tax as 
well), one tax return per state, one audit level, uniform defini­
tions, and 120 days’ lead time for implementing changes to the 
base or rate.52 
52 See footnote 46. 
Alternative Taxation 
Replace a tax system that favors one form of telecom­
munications service over another with a “bit tax,” in which the 
amount of data transmitted is taxed regardless of the originating 
or receiving technology.53 A bit tax is generally opposed due to 
the technological difficulty of assessing it, the notion that it 
taxes (and therefore impedes) the flow of information, and its 
being perceived as a revenue-generating tool. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The main purpose of this report is twofold. First, we have 
described the existing telecommunications tax system in the 
state and presented the history, rationale, and structure of all 
existing taxes, fees, and surcharges paid by service providers 
and consumers. Second, we have examined the equity and 
economic efficiency of the current system and some alterna­
tives. In this section we summarize our findings regarding the 
five key points mentioned at the outset of this report that have 
guided our research. By exploring the costs of the current 
system and a few alternatives, we hope to provide policymakers 
with a clearer view of the implications of past and future 
decisions about telecommunications taxation in the state. Al­
though our chief objective is to present information rather than 
to advocate particular reforms, we conclude by suggesting a 
few apparent improvements our analysis points to. 
Key Issues 
Is the burden of the existing tax treatment of telecom­
munications services and providers distributed equitably? 
Whether we evaluate the distribution of the burden of cur­
rent telecommunications taxes based on the benefit principle, 
the ability-to-pay principle, or the horizontal-equity principle, 
our conclusion is the same. The current system, based 
predominantly on revenue taxation, is not equitable. According 
to the benefit principle, the burden of a tax should be distributed 
according to the benefits received from the government ac­
tivities financed by the tax. Many of the taxes imposed on 
telecommunications are revenue-based taxes, the burden of 
which falls predominantly on consumers of telecommunica­
tions services in proportion to their expenditures. However, 
there is no evidence that these taxpayers benefit in greater 
proportion from the goods and services financed by the taxes 
and certainly not in proportion to expenditures. 
The ability-to-pay principle holds that tax burdens should 
be distributed according to taxpayers’ ability to pay. Because 
the share of household income spent on telecommunications 
services generally decreases as household income increases, 
the burden of taxes imposed on the revenues from the sale of 
services, including all of the federal, state and local taxes, 
surcharges and fees discussed in this report, is distributed 
regressively with respect to income, violating the ability-to-pay 
principle. 
The horizontal-equity principle calls for “equal treatment of 
equals,” which means that taxpayers of equal ability to pay should 
bear equal tax burdens. For the many taxes on telecommunications 
services to satisfy this principle of equity would require that all 
53
 The idea for a bit tax apparently originated with Cordell (1996). A bit 
tax was suggested in a 1999 United Nations report, Human Development 
Report 1999, as a funding mechanism to reduce technology gaps throughout 
the world. 
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taxpayers of similar incomes spend the same amount on 
telecommunications. This is clearly not the case. 
Does the existing tax system impose different tax bur­
dens on the providers (or consumers) of similar services? 
Essentially, this question is asking if the current tax system 
discriminates on the basis of technology. In this era of conver­
gence there are many alternatives to the traditional wireline­
based “telephone call.” Examples include wireless or mobile 
service, including cellular, PCS (personal communications ser­
vices), and satellite, and various types of Internet telephony. 
Our research shows that the tax burden does vary across 
technologies. 
Whether we evaluate the distribution of the 
burden of current telecommunications taxes 
based onthe benefit principle, the ability-to-pay 
principle, or the horizontal-equity principle, 
our conclusionis the same.The current system, 
based predominantly on revenue taxation, is 
not equitable. 
Traditional providers of telecommunications services, 
such as telephone companies, are subject to a much broader 
range of existing federal, state, and local taxes than are some 
of their new competitors, such as cable or satellite providers. 
Consumers of cable or satellite services do not pay the 
federal excise tax (FET). Nor do they pay the numerous 
federal and state taxes and charges to support universal 
service. The largest potential “leakage” regarding voice 
communications is Internet telephony. Internet-telephony 
services escape all of the federal and state universal-service 
taxes, the FET, and the local UUT (utility user tax), and 
consequently enjoy a competitive advantage. 
Another potential source of discriminatory tax treatment 
is the local franchise fee. Cable companies pay franchise 
fees for the privilege of providing specialized services as 
well as for the right to use public rights-of-way to lay their 
cables. In contrast, local exchange carriers (LECs) have 
been exempted by the state from paying such fees. 
Telecommunications companies are also treated differ­
ently under California’s property tax laws. Currently, cable 
television companies are locally assessed while most 
telecommunications companies (LECs, CLECs, wireless) 
are state-assessed. Although there is no evidence that the 
current assessed values of either type company would 
ch an ge s ign if icantly if their assessment s tatus w ere 
switched, the perception of either current or future differ­
ences may influence a firm’s investment in infrastructure. 
There is little economic justification for these differences 
in treatment among technologies. The section on equity and 
efficiency points out that favoring one technology over 
another may be to the detriment of consumer and producer 
welfare over time. Any economic justification for differing 
tax treatment depends on the demand for the final service 
produced, not directly on the technology underlying the 
service. 
Is the existing tax structure the most efficient means 
of raising the current level of tax revenue? 
Telecommunications taxes and charges raise the price of 
telecommunications services relative to other goods and 
services, and consumers respond by consuming fewer 
telecommunications services. The result is what economists 
refer to as excess burden — a loss of economic well-being 
above and beyond the tax revenue collected. We estimate, 
very conservatively, that the current set of telecommunica­
tions taxes leads to a 4 percent efficiency loss, or excess 
burden, in California. 
The most efficient tax system is one that raises needed 
revenue with the least excess burden possible. In order to 
minimize overall excess burden, tax rates must be higher on 
services for which demand is price-insensitive and lower on 
services for which the demand is price-sensitive. Following 
this rule, the excess burden of telecommunications taxes in 
California can be significantly reduced by raising the effec­
tive tax rate on revenues from local exchange access and 
lowering the rate that applies to other services such as 
long-distance and wireless services. Another implication of 
inefficiency is that a more efficient tax system could raise 
more tax revenue and do no more harm to consumers and 
firms than the current system does. 
The existing tax structure also results in a dynamic ef­
ficiency loss due to discrimination among telecommunica­
tions firms (based on the technology used to deliver telecom­
munication services), or between telecommunications 
companies and other companies. This tax discrimination 
distorts the rates of return on investment across companies, 
thereby influencing the growth of the telecommunications 
industry and its various components. 
Does the existing tax system distort the consumer’s 
choice between competing telecommunications services 
and technologies? 
Economic theory suggests that differences in taxes on 
co mp etin g teleco mm u n i ca tio n s s er v ices w ill aff ect 
consumers’ choices. When taxes raise the relative price 
consumers pay for certain goods or services, they respond 
by reducing their consumption of the relatively higher-
priced good or service and substituting others. Techno­
logical change has introduced alternatives to traditional 
telecommunications services, thereby providing more 
choices for consumers and increasing their response to the 
relatively high taxes on traditional services. For example, 
Internet-telephony services escape all of the federal, state, 
and local taxes, surcharges, and fees levied on traditional 
telecommunications services; consequently, consumers of 
telecommunications services, particularly interstate and in­
ternational services, have an incentive to switch to Internet-
based telephony to avoid the high combined tax rate. 
There are currently limited data available to measure the 
extent to which consumers are substituting Internet for tradi­
tional telecommunications. In July 2000, an independent 
analyst of the Web-based voice communication industry 
estimated that roughly 15 million people in the United States 
were using voice communication over the Internet, up from 
5 million in 1999.54 This number is sure to increase further 
with improvements in the technology of Internet telephony. 
54
 Romero (2000). 
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Another consequence of concern to federal, state, and local 
governments is the decline in revenue, as consumers switch 
fromtaxed to untaxed services, and the potential impact on the 
programs these taxes finance. 
Does the existing tax system distort the location decisions 
of telecommunication providers or consumers? 
Location decisions by both businesses and households are 
typically based on a wide array of factors. The availability of 
telecommunications services and their cost are likely to factor 
into the decision, although it is impossible to determine the 
extent of their influence. However, it is logical to say that if all 
else were equal across locations, including the availability of 
telecommunications services, businesses and households 
would choose the location that offers those services at least 
cost. Therefore, the question of whether the tax system distorts 
location choices becomes a question of whether the cost of 
similar services varies across locations. Clearly, as we have 
seen in “Overview of Current State and Local Telecommunica­
tions Taxes in California” in the full report, the answer is yes. 
Telecommunication costs vary from city to city and from 
county to county in California due to variations in the local 
UUT and local franchise fees. We found that the UUT rate alone 
ranges from zero to 11 percent across California cities, and that 
the base to which the tax applies also varies. Therefore, if all 
else were equal, businesses and households would choose to 
locate in no- or low-UUT cities. This choice would be especial­
ly true of businesses that rely heavily on telecommunications 
services and would lead to dynamic efficiency losses. Telecom­
munications businesses themselves may also experience lower 
costs in some California locations due to lower UUT rates and 
lower local franchise fees. 
C alifornia’s method of allocating sale s 
from services and intangible property to the 
s tat e f or ta xati on pu rp oses ma y n ot be 
appropriate for telecommunications and 
information services. 
Our comparison of telecommunications taxes in California 
with those in other large and neighboring states shows that 
California, although it has more state taxes (which may raise 
administrative and compliance costs for telecommunications 
companies located here or doing business in the state), does not 
impose a relatively higher tax burden on telecommunications. 
Telecommunications taxes, therefore, probably play a negli­
gible role in business or household decisions to choose to locate 
in California. 
Recommendations 
In no specific order, we recommend the following. Some of 
these recommendations can be implemented unilaterally by the 
state. Others require California to cooperate with local govern­
ments or with other states. 
California should extend the manufacturers’ invest­
ment credit (MIC) and sales tax exemption for new 
equipment purchases to telecommunications com­
panies. 
As noted before, telecommunications companies are not 
allowed to claim the manufacturers’ investment credit on their 
equipment purchases. The primary purpose of the MIC and 
sales tax exemption on equipment purchases is to avoid the 
pyramiding of taxes that can occur when both the inputs used 
to produce goods and services and the goods and services 
themselves are subject to the tax. The COST study (COST 
2002a) indicates that 14 states provide a sales tax exemption 
for both manufacturers and telecommunications companies. 
California provides a sales tax exemption only for certain new 
corporations. Other corporations (if in an eligible SIC code) 
obtain a 6 percent credit to be applied against their franchise 
tax. 
One rationale for excluding telecommunications companies 
from claiming the MIC and sales tax exemption might be that 
the services provided by telecommunications companies are 
not subject to any sales tax. However, the services these com­
panies provide are subject to a variety of telecommunications-
specific taxes, fees, and surcharges that add up to more than the 
state sales tax in some cases. More fundamentally, the MIC 
serves as a business investment incentive. If the state provides 
incentives to manufacturers to invest in capital, then there is no 
reason why telecommunications companies should not also be 
eligible. Given the importance of communications in the New 
Economy, extending the MIC to telecommunications com­
panies might benefit the economy even more than offering it to 
manufacturing firms.55 
California should reexamine the income apportion­
ment and sourcing rules as they apply to telecom­
munications and information services for taxation 
purposes. 
Are the current rules for corporate franchise and income 
taxes appropriate for telecommunications services? All states 
must cooperate to ensure that multistate income is being appor­
tioned to the proper states to avoid double taxation. California’s 
method of allocating sales from services and intangible proper­
ty to the state for taxation purposes may not be appropriate for 
telecommunications and information services. The “all or noth­
ing” approach of allocating sales from services and intangibles 
may not make sense in the “Information Age.” For example, 
consider a company that has all of its employees and equipment 
located in California but provides server space to customers 
that are mainly located in other states. Under current rules, the 
sales will all be allocated to California, because that is where 
the direct costs of performance occur; no sales will be allocated 
to other states. 
This system may lead a company to locate its direct costs in 
a state with a low income tax rate. On the other hand, such a 
system may be desirable where it is difficult to identify the 
location of customers, such as with the transfer of digitized 
products. In such a case, identification of the costs of perfor­
mance would be simpler. 
Another issue concerning intangible assets is whether they 
should be included in the property factor. Some information-
age businesses have intangibles with a very high value. For 
example, the wireless spectrum licenses of a telecommunica­
tions company may be its most valuable asset. 
55 See Nadiri and Nandi (2001). 
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Of course, it is often difficult to determine whether intangibles 
are located within California (or anywhere else). However, licen­
ses cover specific geographic areas. For other intangibles that 
enable a service to be offered, the telecommunications company 
may be able to apportion based on where the customers of the 
service live (as determined by billing addresses, for example). 
Given the significance of these assets to generating telecom­
munications revenue, consideration should be given to whether, 
and how, all or some intangibles should be included in the appor­
tionment process. 
One approach for examining the apportionment and sourc­
ing issue would be to reopen the Franchise Tax Board’s 1997 
project (see full report, paragraphs on 1997 draft apportion­
ment regulations [pages 25-27]) to provide special apportion­
ment rules for telecommunications, subscription television, 
Internet access, and electronic information services. Alterna­
tively, California could work with other states to update the 
Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act so that 
sourcing rules and the property factor are uniform and the 
potential for double taxation is eliminated. 
California should work with other states and the 
federal government to establish new nexus guidelines 
for the Information Age. 
Federal P.L. 86-272 is out of date because it does not apply 
to services or sales of intangible property. This law should be 
broadened to cover intangibles, such as telecommunications 
and Internet services, and extended to other types of taxes. The 
states should determine if it is possible to work together to 
derive a rule, or whether Congress needs to mandate the stan­
dards. Updating P.L. 86-272 will be challenging because the 
view of what constitutes a “taxable presence” often differs for 
governments and businesses. Challenges also exist in writing 
a law that will not result in confusion and litigation. For 
example, S. 664 (107th Congress) uses the term “substantial 
physical presence,” which is not a term that has been used by 
the courts to describe nexus. Therefore, issues would likely 
arise as to what “substantial” means. 
California should, in cooperation with its local gov­
ernments, simplify and consolidate the various taxes 
and charges imposed on end-user revenues by local 
jurisdictions and the Public Utilities Commission. 
Extend the sales and use tax to telecommunications ser­
vices. California does not apply sales and use taxes to telecom­
munications services. However, local jurisdictions and the 
PUC do impose various fees and taxes on such services. Exten­
sion of the sales and use tax to telecommunications services 
could be a simple and efficient way to replace the numerous 
additional taxes and fees. Although this proposal does nothing 
to improve the inequity of revenue taxation, it might lead to 
more equitable treatment of vendors by looking at the nature 
of the service provided rather than the nature of the company 
(for example, regulated or not regulated). Of course, various 
issues would need to be addressed, such as whether a telecom­
munications sales tax could raise enough revenue to replace 
existing taxes and fees, how the tax could effectively be 
returned to local governments and the PUC, and whether the 
tax could be effectively collected on services provided to 
California residents by remote vendors. 
Cities typically collect 1 percent of sales in taxes unless they 
also have a local-option tax in effect. Most cities with a utility 
user tax would therefore lose revenue if the sales tax replaced 
their UUT. However, a broader sales tax base, extended to other 
services as well as telecommunications services, may make up 
for the lost UUT revenue. A more detailed analysis would be 
needed to ascertain the full revenue impact of such a substitu­
tion. 
Consolidate state and local taxes and charges. Another 
option for simplifying state and local taxes and charges would 
be to replace them with a single state utility tax or one state and 
one local municipal utility tax. This approach has been taken 
by other states, such as Florida and Illinois. While this method 
would significantly reduce the filing requirements of telecom­
munications companies doing business in California, there is a 
trade-off between simplicity and efficiency. As noted before, 
efficient taxation calls for different tax rates on different ser­
vices. 
Consider a flat-rate per-line charge. Consider financing 
universal-service programs from flat-rate per-line charges in­
stead of ad valorem charges. A flat-rate charge, independent of 
the quantity or length of calls or other connections, would result 
in fewer consumption distortions and a lower efficiency cost. 
Substitute income tax funding. Another option to consider 
is to eliminate the array of taxes and charges currently used to 
fund universal service and instead finance these programs from 
general fund revenues, as is done with other welfare and social 
programs. Given that universal service is essentially a welfare 
program, telecommunications providers and customers should 
not bear its burden. One cannot logically use the benefit prin­
ciple to support telecommunications-specific taxation for 
universal service. 
California should encourage local jurisdictions to 
unify the local utility user tax. 
The compliance burden on telecommunications companies 
could be significantly reduced if local jurisdictions were to 
adopt a uniform rate and base for the utility user tax. In 
California, a significant complexity exists in the varying tax 
bases used by more than 150 cities and counties that impose a 
telephone user’s tax. Efforts to provide a uniform base and 
definitions should be undertaken. Success in this area could 
also lead to a single filing and reporting system. 
In addition, should Congress repeal the federal excise tax, 
the definitions used by local jurisdictions, in imposing a 
telephone user’s tax, would no longer exist or need to be 
maintained. The state could assist local jurisdictions in main­
taining uniform definitions should this occur. 
California should establish uniform assessment of 
business property. 
The assessed value of business property should not be 
dependent upon who assesses it. Market-value assessment, 
either by the BOE or a local assessor, would be the most 
equitable and efficient method. Also, the allocation of the 
property tax revenue from a particular property should not be 
a function of who assesses it. 
California should urge local governments to examine 
their local franchise fees. 
Local franchise fees should be set to cover no more than the 
costs to local governments of managing public rights-of-way, 
and not to fund general municipal budgets. Furthermore, with 
different sets of rules applying to different types of providers 
(C)
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and confusion over the meaning of terms (such as cable ser­
vices), it may become increasingly challenging for local gov­
ernments to manage public rights of way and obtain the neces­
sary franchise fees to cover their costs of proper management. 
Also, to the extent providers of telecommunications services 
(broadly defined) are not equally subject to franchise fees, com­
petitive advantages and disadvantages exist that can impede the 
future development of new technologies and services with benefit 
to users. All providers of telecommunication services should be 
equally subject to franchise fees so as to avoid competitive ad­
vantages that influence the future development of new techno­
logies. The free franchise provided to telecommunications com­
panies and the existing franchise fees charged by local 
jurisdictions should be part of any debate on reform of telecom­
munication taxes and fees. 
California and other states should urge the federal gov­
ernment to clarify issues regarding Internet telephony. 
Currently, telephone calls placed over the Internet are not 
subject to federal, state, or local taxes and charges and thus enjoy 
a competitive advantage. Does the state want Internet telephony 
to be used as a tax-avoidance strategy? As the quality of Internet 
telephony improves, more consumers will switch, which may lead 
to decreased economic efficiency and reduced government 
revenues. The only efficient and equitable choices would appear 
to be to try to tax it or to move toward exempting all telecom­
munications services from taxation. 
California and other states should urge the federal gov­
ernment to clarify issues regarding cable telephony. 
Although the FCC has ruled on the legal and regulatory status 
of cable modem service, telephony implemented by cable service 
operators is a different technology. Is it subject to local franchise 
fees? If the telephone service is implemented using switched 
circuits, like the public telephone network, then the answeris “no”; 
divisions of cable companies providing switched circuit service 
fall under the same rules as any other competitive local exchange 
carrier, andare exempt from franchisefees. However, if the service 
is implemented using Internet Protocol (IP) over the cable 
company’s broadband network (as will increasingly be the case), 
then it is not clear whether the service is subject to local franchise 
fees, because the regulatory classification of IP telephony is 
generally unclear (whether implemented by cable companies or 
by other communications firms).56 Is the property used to provide 
the service to be state or locally assessed? What if the same 
network delivers both telephone service and television program­
ming? These are issues that need to be resolved, keeping in mind 
both equity and efficiency consequences. 
California and other states should monitor and work 
with the federal government in its efforts to restrict state 
and local tax systems. 
56
 There is currently no legal basis for the application of franchise fees to 
cable IP telephony in the state, because the FCC has not declared that such 
services are “cable services.” However, the FCC has also declined to classify 
cable IP telephony as an “information service,” which would remove any doubt 
that franchise fees could apply to the service. The indeterminacy of the 
applicability of franchise fees, state, or local property tax assessment, and 
whether universal-service fees apply to IP telephony (whether implemented by 
cable companies or other communications firms) will likely persist until the 
FCC classifies the service one way or the other. 
Maintaining a competitively neutral tax system in California 
may require expanding the tax base to include previously untaxed 
services, such as Internet access. Currently, federal and state 
moratoriums prevent such reforms. California policymakers 
should monitor efforts at the federal level to impose further 
restrictions on the tax bases of state and local governments, due 
to the loss of control produced by such restrictions. Consideration 
should be given to working with other states to create uniform tax 
rules and definitions that may alternatively address some of the 
concerns that lead Congress to impose restrictions on state and 
local tax bases. 
California should work with local governments to pro­
vide uniform relief for low-income individuals and 
households. 
The taxes imposed on telecommunications services are regres­
sive: Taxes represent a larger percentage of a low-income 
household’s income than a high-income household’s. A few cities 
offer UUT exemptions for low-income individuals. Some also 
provide relief from statewide surcharges, but the relief is not 
consistent and in some cases may not be sufficient. Telecom­
munications tax- and fee-reform discussions should consider 
whether more uniform relief should be provided for low-income 
individuals. 
Outside the scope of the present study, a commission has been 
convened to examine state tax policy for a more service- and 
information-oriented economy. In September 2000, SB 1933 was 
enacted (Chapter 619). This legislation called for formation of a 
Commission on Tax Policy in the New Economy to “examine the 
impact of Internet and other forms of electronic technology on 
various types of taxes.” The commission issued a preliminary 
report in November 2002;57 its final report is due this December. 
Conclusion 
Telecommunications represents a major path by which fu­
ture economic growth will travel. If developing the telecom­
munications infrastructure is a goal of state economic policy, 
then tax policy should support this goal by encouraging, or at 
least not discouraging, investment in the state’s telecom­
munications industry. As policymakers at all levels of govern­
ment confront the challenge of reforming our tax system to 
encourage new technology and broad access to various 
telecommunications services, including Internet access, while 
at the same time addressing the needs of tax equity and revenue 
sufficiency, they must first have a clear understanding of the 
current tax system and the incentives (or disincentives) it 
creates. Our study takes this important first step along the path 
to tax reform that will lay the groundwork for more in-depth 
analysis of the equity and efficiency consequences of potential 
reform measures. 
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Glossary 
Technical and economic terms and acronyms used in the 
report are defined here for reference. 
Ad Valorem Tax 
A tax levied in proportion to the value of a good or service; 
used synonymously with “revenue tax” in this report. 
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Administrative Simplicity 
The state of a tax being simple and inexpensive to administer 
and collect. 
Apportionment 
The assignment of taxable income to taxing jurisdictions 
(typically states). California uses a four-factor apportionment 
formula consisting of the sum of a payroll factor, a property 
factor, and a double-weighted sales factor. Each factor is a ratio 
of a California amount to a total amount everywhere. Appor­
tionment results in a specific percentage of a company’s in­
come that is taxed in the state. 
BOE 
California State Board of Equalization. 
Cable Modem Service 
A broadband Internet-access service offered by cable com­
panies. A cable modem is a device that enables a PC to connect 
to a local cable TV line and receive data at about 1.5 megabits 
per second (Mbps). 
Cable Telephony 
Telephony services offered over a cable network. Cable 
telephony is typically offered over a combination of optical 
fiber and coaxial cable plant. Cable telephony can be imple­
mented as a circuit-switched service using installed cable lines 
or resold traditional local phone lines, or as an Internet Protocol 
cable telephony service offered over the coaxial cable lines 
themselves. The latter is known as voice-over cable (VoCable), 
and is closely related to the Internet-telephony services. The 
call path for a circuit-switched service is similar to an LEC’s 
offering, where the cable company’s coaxial cable and fiber 
network replaces the local wireline loop. 
CHCF 
California High-Cost Fund. A program to keep subscribers’ 
rates down in high-cost areas. CHCF-A subsidizes 17 small 
ILECs (see entry). CHCF-B subsidizes the largest ILECs. 
CLEC 
Competitive local exchange carrier. A company that pro­
vides exchange-access services in competition with an estab­
lished telephone local exchange carrier. 
Coaxial Cable 
The kind of copper cable used by cable TV companies 
between the community antenna and user homes and busi­
nesses. It is called “coaxial” because it includes one physical 
channel that carries the signal surrounded (after a layer of 
insulation) by another concentric physical channel. 
COST 
Council On State Taxation. COST is a nonprofit association 
based in Washington, D.C., which has an independent mem­
bership of more than 540 major multistate corporations from 
all sectors of industry engaged in interstate and international 
business. 
CPUC 
California Public Utilities Commission. 
Distortionary Taxation 
Taxation that distorts the relative prices of inputs (such as 
capital, land, or labor) or outputs (such as various kinds of 
telecommunications services). 
DSL 
Digital subscriber line. DSL is a technology for bringing 
high-bandwidth information over ordinary copper telephone 
lines. XDSL refers to different variations of DSL, such as 
ADSL (asynchronous DSL), HDSL (high-speed DSL), SDSL 
(symmetric DSL) and RADSL (Rate-Adaptive DSL). DSL 
offers data at rates up to 6.1 Mbps, enabling continuous trans­
mission of audio and motion video. More typically, individual 
connections provide from 1.544 Mbps to 512 kbps downstream 
and about 128 kbps upstream. A DSL line can carry both data 
and voice signals, and the data part of the line is continuously 
connected. A DSL line can also carry multiple voice channels, 
enabling several virtual lines, each with its own phone number. 
Economic Efficiency 
An economic outcome is efficient (in the sense used by 
economists) if no economic agent (e.g., a consumer or a firm) 
can be made better off without making another agent worse off. 
This definition of efficiency is also called “Pareto efficiency.” 
Efficient outcomes maximize the total economic benefits 
(“total surplus,” in economic jargon) to all agents in sum; if 
additional benefits were possible, then they could be distributed 
to make an agent better off without taking anything away from 
other agents. A final (albeit colloquial) way to describe efficien­
cy is that efficient outcomes make the size of the “economic 
pie” as large as possible (regardless of how the pie is dis­
tributed). 
Efficiency 
See Economic Efficiency, Productive Efficiency, and Tax 
Efficiency.
FET 
Federal excise tax. A tax levied by the federal government 
on all telecommunications services. The proceeds from the 
FET do not fund any particular telecommunications-related 
program; instead, they are part of the general federal tax 
system. 
FTB 
Franchise Tax Board. The FTB collects state personal in­
come taxes and bank and corporation taxes for the State of 
California. 
Headend 
The facility at a local cable TV office that originates and 
communicates cable TV services and cable modem services to 
subscribers. 
High-Speed Services 
Those services with over 200-kbps capability in at least one 
direction. Often used synonymously with broadband services. 
ILEC 
Incumbent local exchange carrier. The telephone company 
that traditionally provided service as a regulated utility in a 
given area. Newer LECs in the same area are called CLECs. 
Information Service 
The offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, stor­
ing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making 
available information via telecommunications (as defined in 47 
U.S.C. section 153(20)). 
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InterLATA Call 
A long-distance call originated and completed within differ­
ent LATAs. Also known as “long-haul long-distance.” 
Internet Telephony 
IP telephony that uses the Internet. See IP Telephony. 
Interstate Services 
Services for which the communication or transmission 
originates in any state, territory, possession of the United 
States, or the District of Columbia and terminates in another 
state, territory, possession, or the District of Columbia. In 
addition, under the FCC’s rules, if over 10 percent of the traffic 
carried over a private or WATS line is interstate, then the 
revenues and costs generated by the entire line are classified as 
interstate. For purposes of universal-service funding, interna­
tional services originating or termination in the U.S. are also 
“interstate.” The FCC has determined that the following ser­
vices are interstate services: “cellular telephone and paging 
services; mobile radio services; operator services; PCS; access 
to interexchange service; special access; wide area telephone 
service (WATS); toll-free services; 900 services; MTS; private 
line; telex; telegraph; video services; satellite services; and 
resale services” (Federal Communications Commission, In the 
Matter of Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service: 
Report And Order, CC Docket No. 96-45, May 7, 1997, at 780). 
Payphone service providers (“payphone aggregators”) must 
also contribute unless they qualify for the de minimis exemp­
tion. Satellite and video service providers must contribute to 
universal service only to the extent that they are providing 
interstate telecommunications services. Thus, for example, 
entities providing, on a common carrier basis, video conferenc­
ing services, channel service or video distribution services to 
cable headends would contribute to universal service. Entities 
providing open video systems (OVS), cable leased access, or 
direct broadcast satellite (DBS) services would not be required 
to contribute on the basis of revenues derived from those 
services. 
IntraLATA Call 
A long-distance call originated and completed within a 
LATA. Also known as “short-haul long-distance” or “local 
toll.” 
Intrastate Services 
Local and long-distance calls that do not cross a state line. 
Any IntraLATA service is an intrastate service (with a few, rare 
exceptions). 
IP 
Internet Protocol, the TCP/IP standard protocol for informa­
tion passed across the Internet. 
IP Telephony 
Internet Protocol telephony, a general term for the techno­
logies that use the Internet Protocol’s packet-switched connec­
tions to exchange voice, fax, and other forms of information 
that have traditionally been carried over the dedicated circuit-
switched connections of the PSTN. IP telephony may be carried 
over the Internet, cable-based networks, or private networks. 
LATA 
Local access and transport areas were created by the 
Modified Final Judgment and define the geographic area over 
which the LEC may provide toll calls. The area may be smaller 
than that covered by a long-distance area code. Even though an 
LEC’s territory may cover many LATAs (PacBell’s in Califor­
nia includes 10 LATAs), the LEC may not provide calls that 
cross LATA boundaries; such interLATA traffic must be carried 
by IXCs. With rare exceptions, LATAs do not cross state lines. 
LEC 
Local exchange company. A telephone company offering 
basic exchange access service. 
Local Loop 
The “last mile” of the telephone network. The local loop is 
the wired connection from a telephone company’s central 
office to its customers’ telephones at homes and businesses. 
This connection is usually on a pair of copper wires called a 
twisted pair. 
MIC 
Manufacturers’ investment credit. A 6 percent franchise and 
income tax credit on purchases of equipment used in manufac­
turing and research and development activities available in 
California. Providers of telecommunications services are not 
eligible for the MIC on their equipment purchases. 
Opportunity Cost 
The value of the most highly valued forgone alternative. The 
opportunity cost of using an asset to produce good X, for 
example, is that the asset owner must give up the opportunity 
to use the asset to produce good Y. Sound economic decisions 
are made on the basis of opportunity costs. 
PCS 
Personal communications services, a wireless phone ser­
vice. Like cellular telephone service, PCS is for mobile users 
and requires a number of antennas to blanket an area of 
coverage. As a user moves around, the phone signal is picked 
up by the nearest antenna and forwarded to a base station that 
connects to the wired telephony network. It generally requires 
more cell transmitters for coverage then cellular service, but 
has the advantage of fewer blind spots. 
Productive Efficiency 
An allocation of inputs such that the only way to increase 
the output of one good is to reduce the output of another good. 
In this sense, no inputs are wasted. 
PSP 
Payphone service provider. 
PSPE 
Payphone Service Providers Enforcement program. The 
PSPE was established by the CPUC to ensure that payphone 
consumer safeguards set forth in the tariffs for the service 
territories of Pacific Bell and Verizon are being followed. These 
consumer safeguards included signage requirements, rate caps 
for intraLATA, interLATA, and directory assistance calls 
within California. Compliance is enforced by inspections of the 
payphones and by advising the local telephone companies to 
disconnect noncompliant payphones. The program is funded 
by per-line charges paid by all PSPs. 
PSTN 
Public Switched Telephone Network. 
(C)
 Tax Analysts 2003. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content. 
State Tax Notes, September 15, 2003 788 
  
  
 
 
    
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
   
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
Special Report / Viewpoint 
SLC 
Subscriber line charge, a monthly charge approved by the 
FCC for subscriber line cost recovery that appears on every 
phone bill for local service. The money is paid to the local 
phone companies. The charge does not vary with usage. 
Sourcing 
Sourcing for transaction tax purposes is assigning a taxable 
transaction (for example, a mobile telephone call) to a taxing 
jurisdiction (for example, a state or a city). 
Switching 
The controlling or routing of signals in circuits to execute 
logical or arithmetic operations or to transmit data between 
specific points in a network. Switching may be performed by 
electronic, optical, or electromechanical devices. 
TA96 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996. Public Law No. 
104-104 (Feb. 8, 1996). 
Tax Efficiency 
The extent to which a tax distorts economic decision-
making and resource allocation. See Economic Efficiency. 
Tax Equity 
Refers to a fundamental sense of fairness in the incidence 
of the tax system, or who bears the burden of the taxes. 
Tax Situs 
In this context, the location of property, for purposes of 
determining whether a given property tax applies. For example, 
a regulated telephone corporation’s property with a tax situs in 
California is subject to California state property tax. 
Telecommunications 
The transmission, between or among points specified by the 
user, of information of the user’s choosing, without change in 
the form or content of the information as sent and received (47 
U.S.C. section 153(43)). Thus, an entity provides telecom­
munications only when it both provides a transparent transmis­
sion path and it does not change the form or content of the 
information. 
Telecommunications Service 
The federal legal definition for telecommunications service 
is the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the 
public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively available 
to the public, regardless of facilities used (47 U.S.C. section 
153(46)). Most states have their own legal definitions.58 
Telephony 
The technology associated with the electronic transmission 
of voice, fax, or other information between distant parties using 
systems historically associated with the telephone. Techno­
logi cal convergence has made the distinction between 
telephony and telecommunications difficult and less important. 
UDITPA 
Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, which 
provides uniform rules for apportioning income for state in­
come tax purposes. 
ULTS 
Universal Lifeline Telephone Service. A universal-service 
program in California. 
User Cost of Capital 
The opportunity cost that an owner incurs as a consequence 
of owning and using an asset, or of putting it to one productive 
use over other potential uses. 
UUT 
Utility user tax. ✰ 
58 See the Tax Cybrary’s list of state definitions at http://www.vertexinc.com/ 
cybrary/telecom/def_by_state.asp. 
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